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When I am writing acknowledgements, the thesis writing will be finished soon. I am 
not sure whether I am happy or sad. I am happy that the thesis will be finished soon, 
but I am sad that PhD life will be over! Most of my PhD friends told me that pursuing 
PhD was very boring and tough. Many old friends do not understand why I am still a 
student, an old student! Every time chatting with me through MSN, they always begin 
at “Hi, did you graduate?” Is PhD study boring? No, I do not think so! Although it is 
difficult, it is not boring!  
Four years ago, I came to Singapore to pursue PhD. It is for my boyfriend (husband 
now), who was also studying PhD in Singapore. I came into a new area again: 
information systems. I studied electrical engineering in undergraduate, and switch to 
economics in master. Of course, the first year was very tough because I had to sit in 
many courses which I was not familiar with. Finally, the grades were very bad. 
However, I still want to remember those days: at central library, my husband and I 
were studying together. At the beginning of second semester, Candy became my 
supervisor. She is very kind and optimistic. When I met difficulties, she always helped 
and encouraged me. When I was confused with research topics, she inspired me to 
find what I was interested in. Later, I chose the topic about open source. Since I 
learned a little knowledge on economics, I tried to use some economics methodology 
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to solve research questions in information systems field. Then, I started to investigate 
the competition issue between open source and proprietary software. The qualify 
exam was coming. Because of poor presentation and lack of preparation, I failed. 
Candy did not blame me, but supported me to revise the model and applied for the 
next QE. Of course, I passed the QE on the second time; otherwise, I could not sit 
here to write these acknowledgements. During this period, Candy and my husband 
gave me much support. They let me feel safety when I met difficulties. Therefore, 
although it was very tough in this period, I was still happy, and enjoyed the life.  
At the end of second year, Candy and I submitted a paper to a conference: ECIS. I 
was very lucky that this paper was accepted. It was my first paper. I cannot use words 
to describe how excited I was. Thanks to Candy, for your effort in this paper and your 
effort in instructing me! In June 2006, I went to Europe to attending conference and 
see my husband who was at Paris at that period. Thanks to IS department and NUS, 
for the financial support for the travelling! Because of ECIS, NUS, IS department and 
Candy, I realized my dream in advance: having a trip to Europe! Is PhD boring? No. 
after a tough period, I got more happiness. I am enjoying PhD life!  
Later, Candy left Singapore to US. I totally understood how desirable she wanted to 
be together with her husband. In order to go on PhD study, Candy introduced Ivan as 
my temporary supervisor. Ivan is an amazing gentleman. He is serious and strict, but 
kind and warmhearted. Although he was very busy and could not instruct me too 
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much time, he can give me much helpful advice in every meeting. During this period, 
I smoothly passed the thesis proposal exam. Thanks to Ivan and Candy, for your kind 
supervisions! 
In March and May 2007, I submitted one paper to PACIS and two papers to ICIS. 
Fortunately, one was accepted by PACIS and one was accepted by ICIS. I was so 
lucky! I had a chance to go to New Zealand and Canada, which I did not image before! 
Is PhD life boring? No. Thanks to IS department and NUS, for the financial support 
for the travelling again! During this period, Khim Yong becomes my supervisor, and 
Ivan and Bernard become my thesis committee members. Khim Yong is a young and 
smart guy. Although he is very thin, he is full of energy. He is an expert in 
econometrics in our department. He gave me much helpful suggestions in the research, 
especially in analysis of the econometrics models. When I prepared the presentation 
in ICIS, he squeezed his valuable time to listen to my rehearsal. Khim Yong, I am 
always appreciating your kindly help! Bernard, the head of our department, is very 
amiable and always has smile on the face. He is very very busy, but still can squeeze 
time to meet with me to discuss my research. Thanks to Bernard, for your kind support 
to my research.  
So far, June 2008, I still believe that my PhD life is rich, meaningful and full of surprise. 
I am very happy during these four years. Besides Candy, Ivan, Khim Yong, Bernard, IS 
department, and NUS, I also thank professor Teo Hock Hai. Your course brings me to 
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IS area, and lets me know what is IS, and how to do IS research. I thank my best friends: 
Qiuhong, Guo Rui, Shaomei, and Yang Xue. Our friendships make me much happier 
and more optimistic.  
To my family, thanks to mother and father, you always give me everything selfless. It is 
you who give me such a happy and wonderful life!  
At last, to my sweet heart, Kang Kai, I do not thank you here by words, but I would like 
to use my whole life to love you, care you and be together with you!  
 
Wu Jing 
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This thesis applies social network analysis and economic theory and methodology in 
Information Systems research to study three issues associated with open source 
software projects and their applications in the software industry. 
The growing popularity of open source software has been garnering increasing 
attention not only from practitioners in the industry, but also from many academic 
scholars who are interested in examining this phenomenon in a rigorous in-depth 
manner. To date, as a testament to the popularity of open source software, there are also 
numerous open source projects being hosted on many large online repositories. While 
some of these open source projects are active and thriving, some of these projects are 
either languishing or show no developing activities at all. This observation thus begs 
the important question of what are the influential factors that impact on the success or 
failure of open source projects. As such, to deepen our understanding of the evolution 
of open source projects, the first study aims to analyze the evolution of open source 
projects from inception to success or failure by using the theoretical lens of social 
network analysis. Based on extensive empirical data collected from open source 
development projects, we study the impact of the communication patterns of open 
source projects on the outcomes of these projects, while accounting for project-specific 
characteristics. Such an approach thus incorporates both the supply side (developers) 
and the demand side (end users) factors. Since communication patterns may change 
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with time, success or failure of open source projects is transient. Therefore, we observe 
the changes in communication pattern of each project team over extended periods.  
Open source software has become an increasingly threatening competitor to traditional 
proprietary software. In the second study, we examine the competition between 
proprietary and open source software by considering consumer’s taste. In order to 
capture the effect of consumer’ taste on the firm’s strategy, we first use a 
one-dimensional Hotelling model, and then analyze a two-dimensional vertical 
differentiation model. In particular, we seek to answer how commercial software 
vendors should optimally set the price and design its product when competing with the 
open source product. 
The popularity of open source not only poses competition to proprietary software 
producers, but also brings to light a new competing strategy: opening part of the source 
code. Many industry practices suggest that participating in open source projects may 
bring profit to software firms. In the third study, we model the competition between two 
profit-oriented firms, and analyze the optimal strategy of the firm that uses open source 
as a competing strategy. We seek to answer: Why does a for-profit firm open up its 
commercial product? How much should the firm open to achieve most profit? What is 
the best competition structure of the market when both firms choose their best 
competitive strategies? Furthermore, we consider the impact of the presence of a 
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competing pure open source product. We seek to find how the presence of open source 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis applies social network analysis and economic theory and methodology in 
Information Systems (IS) research to study issues associated with open source software 
(OSS) projects and their applications in the software industry. The popularity of the 
OSS phenomenon has been attracting more and more attention from both industry and 
academia. Many traditional software companies have either enrolled themselves in 
OSS development or applied OSS strategy. Meanwhile, academic researchers have also 
paid great attention to the OSS phenomenon. They have examined various aspects of 
OSS, social, economic and organizational. These studies have made use of different 
theories and methodologies in its field to explain the OSS phenomenon. This thesis will 
examine interesting OSS issues from social and economic theoretical perspective.  
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1.1 General Background 
IS discipline is broad and has been defined in different ways. It has been depicted as 
“the study of the interaction of development and use of IS with organizations” (Cushing 
1990), and “understanding what is or might be done with computer and software 
technical systems, and the effects they have in the human, organizational and social 
world” (Avgerou and Cornford 1995). Since IS research is a relative new research area, 
the theories and methodologies from other fields such as economics, psychology, social 
science, and computer science have been widely applied in IS. 
The application of social network theory or social network analysis (SNA) in the field 
of IS can help to better understand the impact of social factors on IS applications. SNA 
has emerged as a key technique in many fields such as sociology, anthropology, 
statistics, mathematics, information sciences, education, and psychology. SNA aims to 
understand the relationships between people, groups, organizations, and other types of 
social entities (Granovetter 1973; Wasserman et al. 1994; Wellman et al. 1998) by 
description, visualization, and statistical modeling.  
Economics has been widely accepted as one of the main IS research disciplines. It has 
been deemed as one of the four reference disciplines of IS together with computer 
science, management science and organization science (Benbasat and Weber 1996). 
Various economic theories, such as game theory and economic models of 




Recent years have seen a rapid growth of OSS. OSS refers to those programs “whose 
licenses give users the freedom to run the program for any purpose, to study and modify 
the program, and to redistribute copies of either the original or the modified program 
without having to pay royalties to previous developers” (Wheeler, 03). OSS involves a 
copyright-based license to keep private intellectual property claims out of the way of 
both software innovators and software adopters, while preserving a commons of 
software code that everyone can access (O’Mahony 2003). It is typically created within 
OSS projects, often initiated by an individual or a group that wants to develop a 
software product to meet particular needs.  
Since the first OSS was developed by Richard Stallman (GNU) in the 70’s, there have 
been a large number of open source applications, ranging from common office suites 
such as StarOffice, to database (mySQL) and thousands of specialized scientific 
applications. Nowadays, OSS has been widely adopted for different purposes, 
including, for example, web servers (Apache, iPlanet/Netscape), e-mail servers 
(Sendmail), programming languages (Perl, Java, Python, GCC, Tk/TCL), and 
operating systems (Linux, BSD Unix). More than 65 percent of all public websites are 
operated on the open-source Apache web server; 80 percent of the world’s e-mail traffic 
is managed by Sendmail; and nearly 40 percent of large American corporations make 
use of the open-source GNU/Linux operating system (Weber 2004). Not only popular 
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in the software market, OSS phenomenon has also attracted greater attentions from 
academia, especially from the IS field. IS researchers have applied different theories 
and methodologies to investigate various issues of the OSS phenomenon, including 
competition between OSS and proprietary software, licensing problems of OSS, 
coordination in OSS, and survival of OSS projects. They have already achieved many 
results which are helpful for industry and research.  
This thesis applies social network analysis and economic theory and methodology to 
study issues associated with OSS projects and their applications in the software 
industry. I will briefly introduce them one by one in the following section.  
1.2 Three Studies 
It is a fact that OSS exists and is popular in the software market. It is also a fact that only 
a small proportion of OSS has survived in the market. This phenomenon attracts us to 
investigate the survival of the OSS projects in the evolving periods. However, the 
existence of OSS must affect the profitability of proprietary software, which spurs us to 
examine the competition between OSS and proprietary software. The software 
companies not only face the competition from OSS, but also from their colleagues. The 
software firms may use open source as the competitive strategy to compete with others. 
How can the firm use the open source as a competing weapon?  
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1.2.1 Evaluating Longitudinal Success of Open Source Software 
Projects 
Although a few OSS projects, such as Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP, have achieved 
extraordinary success and are among the most prominent software used in the 
technology industry, there are lots of OSS projects which are lackluster with no 
developing activity at all. Many die at the beginning, while others survive, but with 
little momentum behind them (Thomas and Hunt 2004). This begs questions of how to 
deal with the growing pains for the OSS projects: Why do some OSS projects achieve 
success while many others don’t? What are the factors that could influence the success 
or failure of the OSS projects? To deepen our understanding of the OSS, it is essential to 
explore the factors that have contributed to its success or failure. In the first study of 
this thesis, we will examine OSS success through the social network perspective. The 
main objective is to identify the presence and significance of factors in predicting the 
success of an OSS project. We seek to provide insights to the following questions: (1) 
whether the success of open source projects is correlated to the social structure of the 
development teams, i.e. the communication pattern of the project team; and (2) what is 
the impact of communication pattern on the survival of open source projects in a long 
term. Based on real-world empirical data, we study communication pattern of open 
source project team, as well as considering project-specific characteristics, on the 
project success. We collect data from SourceForge.net, the largest repository of open 
source projects, which is widely used in most OSS studies. The details of this study are 
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described in Chapter 2.  
1.2.2 Optimal Software Design and Pricing 
With the free of charge open source products available in market, many commercial 
firms have been dealing with continued pressure and competition from the open source 
world. OSS makes source code publicly available for free usage and modification, 
including bug fixing and customizing features. Ever since the burgeoning of OSS, it has 
attracted more and more attention from individual users and organizations due to its 
“free of charge” and “freedom of distribution and modification”. Without a doubt, the 
profitability of a commercial software publisher is affected (if not threatened) when the 
consumers are offered with an alternative free option other than the proprietary 
software. In order to make profit and maintain their dominance in the software market, 
the commercial software publisher must design different business and economic 
strategies to respond to the emergence of open source software. The second study in 
this thesis is to answer the key question about how a profit-seeking software firm 
should compete with open source software. Although competition has been the classic 
research topic in economic literature, the competition between open source and 
proprietary software has the following distinct features that deserve further analysis: (i) 
traditional duopoly competition model studies the equilibrium of two profit-making 
firms while open source software is free of charge and can’t be made for profit by itself; 
(ii) traditional competition models normally study the optimal pricing while in case of 
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software competition, the software producers has two arms to fight with competition – 
pricing and product design. For instance, if the commercial product is quite similar to 
open source products, the commercial firm faces fierce competition; but if the 
proprietary software is highly differentiated, the product might appeal to a certain part 
of the market; (iii) software products exhibit positive network externalities, which 
further complicates the decision of optimal price and product design.  
We adopt two models to analyze the competition between open source and proprietary 
software. We first employ a one-dimensional stylized Hotelling model to study the 
optimal pricing and design of proprietary software in the presence of competitive open 
source software. We address the following research questions: (1) what is the impact of 
open source software’s positioning (design) on the optimal price, design and profit of 
the proprietary software; (2) how is social welfare affected by the positioning of open 
source software; (3) what are the firm’s optimal strategy and profit when there’s 
positive network effect. In this model, we use one dimension to represent consumer 
taste. We did not give the details of the consumer taste. In the second model, we try to 
analyze the consumer taste in a specific way: functionality and usability. In this model, 
we study the optimal design and pricing strategies for a monopoly commercial software 
firm to compete with open source software. The commercial software producer has to 
invest in a certain amount cost to achieve a certain level of usability and functionality 
for its product. We establish a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model to derive 
the optimal price and design of the commercial software product given the 
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characteristics of the open source software. The details of this study are described in 
Chapter 3. 
1.2.3 Partially Opening Source Code 
With regard to the continuous competition between the open source and the proprietary 
camp, the age-old saying still works: if you can’t beat him, join him. For the proprietary 
software publishers, it is not advisable to treat open source only as the competitor. 
Instead, proprietary firms can learn from it, absorb the advantages of it, and make use of 
it. Some industry practitioners have come to realize that proprietary software can 
leverage the open source idea and profit from it (Taft, 2005). Adam Fitzgerald, director 
for developer solutions at BEA Systems Inc., of San Jose, California, said at the panel at 
the BEAWorld conference: “You need to start thinking about what an open-source 
solution can do for you and identify best practices and best-of-breed open-source 
technology. This notion of blending open source solutions is what we see customers 
already using.” “Combining the best open source software and the best commercial 
software will give you the best solution,” said by Zhongyuan Zheng, vice president for 
R&D at Beijing-based Red Flag Software Co. Ltd., China’s premier Linux vendor and 
maker of Red Flag Linux. More and more commercial firms have realized that the 
adoption of an open source strategy can bring strategic advantage in the aggressively 
competitive environment. Netscape, for example, open up its web browser and give out 
of the code for free as the Mozilla open source project. The other big firms like IBM 
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and Sun also keep up with this trend and open part of their commercial software codes. 
The open source movement in the software industry, in which commercial software 
publishers open part of their source codes, attracts a lot of attention from academia and 
industry. Among those papers discussing the competition between OSS and proprietary 
software, although some researchers looked into the incentives for commercial firms to 
participate in OSS development (Lerner and Tirole 2001), few studies examined the 
open source as the commercial firm’s competing strategy to maximize profit. Thus, in 
the third study of my thesis, we will study the competition between two profit-oriented 
firms and analyze the model that when open source is as a software company’s 
competing for-profit strategy, (1) why a for-profit firm opens up its commercial product; 
(2) how much the firm should open to achieve most profit; (3) what the equilibrium and 
best competition structure of the market are when both firms choose their best 
competitive strategy. The details of this study are described in Chapter 4.  
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis applies social network analysis and economic theory and methodology in 
Information Systems research to study issues associated with open source software 
projects and their applications in the software industry.  
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1.3.1 Evaluating Longitudinal Success of Open Source Software 
Projects  
This study is among the first to explore open source project success through the lens of 
social network perspective. Through social network analysis of empirical data collected 
from open source projects, we study the impact of the communication patterns of open 
source projects on the outcomes of these projects, while accounting for project-specific 
characteristics. Such a novel approach incorporates both the supply side (developers) 
and the demand side (end users) factors. We observe the changes of communication 
pattern of each project across extended periods, and investigate the evolving success of 
open source projects by looking at the dynamic impacts of communication patterns. 
1.3.2 Optimal Software Design and Pricing 
The objective of this study is to answer the key question about how a profit-seeking 
software firm should compete with open source software. Although competition has 
been the classic research topic in economic literature, some distinct features are 
examined in this study. Traditional competition models normally study the optimal 
pricing while in case of software competition, the software producers has two arms to 
fight with competition – pricing and product design. This study not only investigates 
the optimal pricing of the software firm, but also finds the optimal product design.  
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1.3.3 Partially Opening Source Code 
In this study, instead of focusing on the competition between open source and 
proprietary software, we study the competition between two profit-oriented firms, and 
analyze the model that when open source is as a software company’s competing 
for-profit strategy. There are very few papers discussing the situation when some 
software firms open part of their code for profit reasons to actively compete with other 
software firms. This study gives us the idea that software firm can improve its 
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Chapter 2. Evaluating Longitudinal Success of 
Open Source Software Projects: A Social 
Network Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen a rapid growth of open source software (OSS). Ever since the 
first OSS was developed by Richard Stallman (GNU) in the 1970’s, a multitude of open 
source applications have been developed, ranging from office productivity software 
such as StarOffice, to database and thousands of specialized scientific applications. 
Nowadays, OSS has been widely adopted for different purposes, including web servers 
(Apache, iPlanet/Netscape), e-mail servers (Sendmail), programming languages (Perl, 
Java, Python, GCC, Tk/TCL), and operating systems (Linux, BSD Unix). It is reported 
that more than 65 percent of public websites are now backed by the open-source 
Apache web server; 80 percent of the world’s e-mail traffic is managed by Sendmail; 
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and nearly 40 percent of large American corporations make use of the open-source 
GNU/Linux operating system (Weber 2004).  
What is OSS? OSS refers to those programs “whose licenses give users the freedom to 
run the program for any purpose, to study and modify the program, and to redistribute 
copies of either the original or the modified program without having to pay royalties to 
previous developers” (Wheeler 2003). OSS involves a copyright-based license to keep 
private intellectual property claims out of the way of both software innovators and 
software adopter, while preserving a commons of software code that everyone can 
access (O’Mahony 2003). It is typically created within OSS projects, often initiated by 
an individual or a group that wants to develop a software product to meet their own 
needs.  
The growing popularity of OSS has garnered increasing attention not only from 
practitioners in the industry, but also from academic scholars who are interested in 
examining this phenomenon in a rigorous in-depth manner. Various case studies have 
contributed to a better understanding of the OSS phenomenon. Lakhani and Hippel 
(2003) considered the nature and the functioning of the community of developers of the 
Apache software. Hertel et al. (2003) focused on factors determining the level of 
engagement in the Linux project. Krogh et al. (2003) analyzed the strategic process by 
which new individuals joined the community of developers of FreeNet, a peer-to-peer 
network of information distribution. These studies shed new light on how large 
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communities of developers arise, work and coordinate to achieve the success of an open 
source project. However, previous case studies are limited to large and popular projects 
only. While in-depth examinations on such large and popular projects are crucial to 
better understand how communities work effectively, findings from such studies may 
not be sufficiently representative of the open source community in general. 
Several large open source projects have achieved extraordinary success and are among 
the most prominent software used in the technology industry. However, many open 
source projects have been lackluster with few or no development activities at all. Many 
flounder at the beginning, while others survive, but with little momentum behind them 
(Thomas and Hunt 2004). The failure of a large number of open source projects begs 
the following key question: What factors could influence the longitudinal success of 
open source projects? Specifically, since communications among developers are 
essential to the survival of the project, how does the communication pattern of the 
development team affect the evolving success of an open source project? In addition, 
the definitions and measurements of project success from the developers’ and the end 
users’ perspectives are different, how does this difference affect the impact of the other 
influential factors on a project’s success? To deepen our understanding of OSS, it is 
essential for Information Systems (IS) researchers to study these questions theoretically 
and provide insights to the business world. 
The open source community is characterized by the voluntary participation of software 
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developers collaborating over the Internet with the aim to produce license-free software. 
The developers have been creating value through developing and spreading new 
knowledge and capabilities, fostering innovations, and building and testing trust in 
working relations, relying heavily on information and communication technologies to 
accomplish their tasks (Powell et al 2004). For the development teams, to achieve their 
objectives and successfully complete their tasks, information must be effectively 
exchanged. Thus, communication and coordination have been found to be two major 
aspects that significantly affect the performance of such teams (Johansson et al. 1999; 
Maznevski and Chudoba 2001). OSS development is a complex socio-technical activity, 
requiring people to interact with each other. Thus, it is interesting to study the 
communication patterns of open source development teams to investigate the relation 
between coordination and communication characteristics (i.e., the social network 
attributes) of OSS project teams and the evolving outcomes of open source projects. 
While others have studied the determinants of open source success (e.g., Fershtman and 
Gandal 2004; Comino et al. 2005; Sen 2005; Colazo et al. 2005; Stewart et al. 2006; 
Grewal et al. 2006), this study is among the first to explore open source project success 
through the lens of social network perspective. Through social network analysis of 
empirical data collected from open source projects, we study the impact of the 
communication patterns of open source projects on the outcomes of these projects, 
while accounting for project-specific characteristics. Such a novel approach thus 
incorporates both the supply side (developers) and the demand side (end users) factors. 
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As we know, communication patterns may change with time and thus success or failure 
of OSS projects is transient. It is therefore important to examine the dynamic impacts of 
communication patterns on project success such that we can assess the long term 
sustainability of OSS projects. Thus, in this study, we observe the changes of 
communication pattern of each project across an extended period of 13 months, and 
investigate the evolving success of open source projects by looking at the dynamic 
impacts of communication patterns.  
Following the panel data analysis methodology, we obtain model estimation results 
from Three-Stage Least Squares accounting for both period and project fixed effects, as 
well as carry out several robustness checks of different models. The effects of 
communication pattern, i.e., project centrality, project density, and leadership centrality, 
on project development activity and popularity respectively are examined and 
uncovered by our research model. Based on our results, the impacts of communication 
patterns on project success considered from the demand side and the supply side are 
different. It implies that project managers can reap the benefits if they can structure 
their project teams with care. Therefore, according to the objectives of projects, a 
proper and planned control for the communication among team members is crucial for 
the survivability of the open source projects. 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the theoretical background of 
communication patterns and explains why and how it can be applied to open source 
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project studies. We provide definitions of key concepts such as the success of open 
source projects and the communication pattern. Then we propose the research model 
and the hypotheses in Section 2.3. We describe the operational details of our empirical 
research, such as criteria for project selection and measures of constructs in Section 2.4, 
followed by discussions of the results in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes this 
study with directions of future research. 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
In this study, we propose that the social structure of open source project teams may play 
a critical role in the success of open source projects. Based on social network theory, we 
investigate the interactive communications among open source contributors in order to 
find the impact of communication patterns on open source project success. In this 
section, we define key concepts such as success, social structure, social network 
analysis, and communication pattern in the open source environment. 
2.2.1 Communication Pattern of Open Source Project Teams 
Open source developers collaborate mainly over the Internet. The advent of 
information and communication technologies provides instantaneous global 
accessibility for the open source community. Software development is a complex 
socio-technical activity. The developers of an open source project collaborate via 
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interactions or communications in the form of email exchange, message boards, etc. 
(Sawyer 2004). The communication and interaction among individuals and groups 
form the network of relationships inside the project team. To better understand the 
impact of such communications on the success of open source projects, we employ the 
social network analysis (SNA) method, which helps to identify the prominent patterns 
in such networks, trace the flow of information (and other resources), and discover 
potential relationships between the social structure and the final product, i.e. the 
software system (Kidane and Gloor 2007).  
SNA (also called social network theory) has emerged as a key technique in many fields 
such as sociology, anthropology, statistics, mathematics, information sciences, 
education, and psychology. SNA aims to understand the relationships between people, 
groups, organizations, and other types of social entities (Granovetter 1973; Wasserman 
et al. 1994; Wellman et al. 1998) by description, visualization, and statistical modeling. 
It models social relationships in terms of nodes and ties. Nodes represent the individual 
actors or groups within the network, and ties or links show interactions or exchange of 
information flows between the nodes. In the context of open source projects, nodes are 
the developers, and ties are the interactions (i.e., communications) between the 
developers. In the field of Information Systems, previous literatures which focused on 
OSS research, have shown that social networks operate on many levels and play a 
critical role in determining the way of solving problems, running organizations, and the 
degree to which individuals achieve their goals. Hippel and Krogh (2003) argured that 
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open source development has become a significant social phenomenon, and that 
developers and users form a complex social network via various electronic 
communication channels on the Internet. Madey et al. (2002) conducted an empirical 
investigation of the open source movement by modeling OSS projects as a 
collaborative social network and found that the open source development community 
can be modeled as a self-organizing social network. Xu et al. (2005) explored some 
social network properties in the open source community to identify patterns of 
collaborations.  
Social structure, a term frequently used in social theory, refers to entities or groups in 
definite relation to each other, to relatively enduring patterns of behavior and 
relationship within social systems (Scott 2002). The social structure of an open source 
development team describes how people interact, behave and organize in the 
community. Investigating social structure is a useful way to understand team practice 
such as coordination, control, socialization, continuity and learning (Freeman 1979; 
Scacchi 2002). Software engineers have realized that there are inevitable linkage 
between the group performance and the social structure of the development team. 
Therefore, a better understanding of the social structure can help with the development 
planning (Scacchi 2002). Crowston and Howison (2005) interviewed a member of the 
Apache Foundation’s incubator team at ApacheCon 2003 1 . The incubator team 
                                                 
1 The Apache foundation is a prestigious umbrella organization for teams developing free and open 
source software. It has created an incubator to ensure that the projects which seek to join the Foundation 
are of sufficient quality and longevity. http://incubator.apache.org 
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indicated that they were concerned that overly heavy reliance on a small number of 
(possibly corporate funded) developers was a major threat to the sustainability of the 
project and thus to the suitability of the project for Apache incubation (Crowston and 
Howison 2005). The study of social structure helps to identify the reasons for such 
concerns since it provides an assessment measure of finding the crucial members as 
well as their importance with regard to the project. 
The communication pattern describes the structure of interactions during 
communication. It can be characterized by several attributes. According to social 
network theory, the centrality and density of a group are related to its efficiency of 
problem solving, perception of leadership and the personal satisfaction of participants 
(Scott 2002). The concepts of density and centrality refer to different aspects of the 
overall “compactness” of the network (Scott 2002). Density describes the general level 
of cohesion in the network while centrality describes the extent to which this cohesion 
is organized around particular focal points. Centrality and density, therefore, are 
important complementary measures (Scott 2002) of the communication pattern.  
Density measures how closely a network is connected, which in turn determines the 
readiness of a group in response to changes in processes and outcomes. It is defined as 
the percentage of ties that exist in a network out of all possible ties.  
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Centrality2  can be defined on an individual or overall level for a network. The 
centrality of an individual node refers to the number of direct links to other nodes in a 
network. If we define the link between nodes as communications, a person with a high 
centrality represents a major channel of information exchange. In some sense he is a 
focal point of communication, at least with respect to others who has contact with him. 
At the opposite extreme is a point of low centrality degree. The occupant of such a 
position is likely to be seen as peripheral. His position isolates him from direct 
involvement with most of the others in the network and cuts him off from active 
participation in major communication processes. Thus, the centrality measure indicates 
whether a group member is “in the thick of things” (Freeman 1979; Mullen et al. 1991). 
In order to track the influence of the project leader(s), we examine the individual 
centrality measure of project leader(s) since the centrality of the leader(s) indicates the 
prestige and influence of the leader(s) in the project team (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).   
One can also define the centrality of a network as a whole. Project centrality, centrality 
of an entire project team, captures the inequality of the developers’ contributions to the 
project: high score of project centrality implies that the power of individual developers 
varies rather substantially, and overall, positional advantages are rather unequally 
distributed in this network. Social network theory (Leavitt 1951) suggests that the 
speed and efficiency of a network in solving problems are related to the inequality of 
the developers’ contributions to the project. 
                                                 
2 The detailed (mathematical) definitions and examples of centrality are given in the Appendix. 
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2.2.2 Success of Open Source Projects 
Apart from licensing terms, OSS has other distinct features that are not seen in 
proprietary software. OSS development frequently depends on volunteers coordinating 
their efforts without the governance of a common organizer, and the end product is 
often provided for free (Feller and Fitzgerald 2000). Therefore, unlike traditional 
firm-driven endeavors, open source projects are not always driven by direct profit 
motives (Lakhani and Wolf 2003). The success indicators of commercial software such 
as market share, on time and on budget delivery cannot be readily applied in the OSS 
setting. In the OSS environment, there is usually no pre-determined deadline, a priori 
budget, or a set of specifications (Scacchi 2002), and market share of OSS is difficult to 
assess. Therefore, a set of different indicators are necessary to define the success of 
open source projects. 
Success is a subjective concept and therefore it is not always clear on how to define 
success. Raymond (1998) defined successful OSS projects as those characterized by a 
continuing process of volunteer developers fixing bugs, adding features and releasing 
software “often and early”. Since a large number of OSS projects are abandoned by 
their developers, it is critical to attract contributors on an on-going basis to keep the 
project sustainable (Markus et al. 2000). Crowston et al. (2003) explored success 
measures in the Information Systems literature and suggested a portfolio of success 
measures, including measures of the development process. Subsequently, Crowston et 
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al. (2004) analyzed four success measurements by using data from SourceForge.net and 
suggested that a project that attracts developers, maintains a high level of activity, fixes 
bugs and has many users downloads can described as successful. There are some other 
scholars advocating different success measurements. For example, Colazo et al. (2005) 
singled out two particular items from those success measures: the number of developers 
joining in a project and the relative level of the developers’ productivity while they 
were engaged in the project (i.e., contribution). Comino et al. (2005) utilized the 
development stage (i.e., planning, pre-alpha, alpha, beta, stable and mature) of a project 
as the representation of the level of success of a project. Fershtman and Gandal (2004) 
considered an alternative definition of system success based on output per contributor. 
They examined how the type of license, the programming language, the intended 
audience and other factors affect the output per contributor in OSS projects. Sen (2005) 
made use of project popularity (defined by Freshmeat.net) as the measure for OSS’s 
installation base. Stewart et al. (2006) adopted user interest as the measurement of OSS 
project success. In particular, they used the development activity to measure the 
development-oriented success. Grewal et al. (2006) adopted two kinds of success 
measures: the number of CVS 3  commits as an indicator of successful technical 
refinement, and the number of downloads over the life span of a project as the indicator 
                                                 
3 Concurrent Versions System (CVS) is a program that lets a code developer save and retrieve different 
development versions of source code. It also lets a team of developers share control of different 
versions of files in a common repository of files. This kind of program is sometimes known as a 
version control system. CVS was created in the UNIX operating system environment and is available 
in both Free Software Foundation and commercial versions. It is a popular tool for programmers 
working on Linux and other UNIX-based systems. 
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of market or commercial success. 
In our study, we consider success from both the supply side (developers) and the 
demand side (end users). Since open source development relies on voluntary input, 
attracting and motivating contributors are key factors for its success. In other words, 
development activity is a key indicator of project success: high development activity 
shows that the developers in the project continuously contribute to the project; the 
project will evolve until it has no development activity at all. On the demand side, 
project popularity is a key measure of the project’s success: high popularity shows that 
there are many users using or are interested in using the open source software. On the 
other hand, an OSS project will cease to exist or progress if there is no demand or if no 
one makes use of the end product for an extended period.  
In summary, our research is based on the theoretical fields of social network analysis, 
and we measure OSS success on both the developer and the end user side. To the best of 
our knowledge, we are among the first to simultaneously study the success of OSS 
projects from both the supply side and the demand side, while exploring the 
determinants of open source project success through a social network perspective of the 
communication patterns within OSS projects. 
2.3 Research Model 
This study focuses on the communication pattern of open source development teams. 
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Specifically, we propose hypotheses with regard to how communication patterns may 
affect the success of open source projects. We define the following constructs that 
capture the communication pattern of an open source project: (1) project centrality, 
which measures the inequality of the developers’ contributions in the project, and (2) 
project density, which measures the closeness of a network and its readiness to respond 
to changes, and (3) leadership centrality, which measures the influence and prestige of 
the project leader(s). In addition, we use the level of development activity and project 
popularity to measure the degree of success from the supply side and the demand side 
respectively. Our research model is shown in Figure 2.1. 
  
Figure 2.1 Research Model 
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2.3.1 Communication Pattern and Project Success 
Project Centrality and Development Activity: Project centrality measures the 
difference or inequality of contributions among developers, i.e., it examines whether 
there is an outstanding group of contributors in the project (Freeman 1979). Past 
research in social networks has shown that centrality is an important measure of group 
performance (Freeman et al. 1980). The investigation of project centrality can shed 
light on whether the inequality of the developers’ contributions affects the success of 
the project. When the project centrality is high, the power of individual developers 
varies rather substantially. Social network theory suggests that networks with high 
centrality have the advantage of speedy and flexible information diffusion within the 
network (Cummings and Cross 2003). In a network with high centrality score, there are 
certain developers who have access to more resources of the network than others in the 
network. These “core” developers are responsible for exchanging information and 
allocating resources among the team members. In most cases, these core developers are 
the most capable developers in the team. They filter out less meaningful messages 
while distributing the most useful information and allocate resources to its best usage. 
This increases the efficiency and quality of the communication among the developers 
and enhances the team members’ access to resources and information. Therefore, the 
development process, which involves collaborative tasks such as debugging, 
document writing, upgrading, patching, and consulting, can be better handled with 
better resource allocation and higher quality delivery. In the strategic management 
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literature, good coordination within development teams (which helps to attract users, 
resources, and collaborators) is considered as a key determinant of software 
development success (Kidane and Gloor 2007). Since higher project centrality is 
associated with better organization and more efficient information exchange, we 
propose that a more centralized project is likely to achieve higher level of 
development activities: 
Hypothesis 1: Project centrality will positively affect the level of project 
development activities. 
Project Centrality and Popularity: In the high centrality project, the power of 
individual developers varies rather substantially. The higher the project centrality, it is 
more likely that there are more linkages between the core developers and the other 
contributors (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The core developers take charge of 
exchanging most information or resource among the project team members. Thus, the 
communications are largely dependent on the core developers. Oftentimes however, 
open source developers simultaneously participate in more than one open source 
project or are affiliated to other commercial projects. The developers usually have a 
limited amount of time to contribute the project (Hinds and Lee 2008). Once the core 
developers lose interest or pay insufficient efforts to the projects, it will greatly affect 
the coordination of the development team as well as the response to the end users’ 
requests. Open source users, especially new users, usually put more emphasis on the 
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continual support and maintenance provided by the project teams. Heavy reliance on a 
single developer or a few developers threatens the continual adoption or usage of OSS 
from end users who seek continuous support and maintenance from the OSS project. 
Inconsistent, insufficient maintenance and support of open source projects by 
developers typically generate negative word of mouth which reduces the reputation of 
such projects. Given the increased likelihood of negative word of mouth and 
reputation in the OSS community, it is thus likely that the demand popularity of such 
projects decrease over time. Therefore, we propose that highly centralized OSS 
projects will be less likely to attract end users, i.e., less likely to increase the level of 
popularity of such projects: 
Hypothesis 2: Project centrality will negatively affect the level of project 
popularity. 
Project Density and Development Activity: In a network of software developers, a 
higher density indicates a greater degree of interaction among the members and thus 
closer collaboration among members (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). However, a 
higher project density makes the dissemination of knowledge more time-consuming, 
because information and knowledge needs to travel through the extended hierarchies 
of the project team. The higher density, the more information is repeatedly 
communicated within the project team. An example of a three-developer project 
illustrates this problem: suppose developer A has communications with B, B with C, 
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and C with A, then developer C may obtain the same information from both A and B. 
In projects with many developers, there may be more occurrences of repeated 
information exchange. The efficiency of the communication is therefore substantially 
reduced in projects with high density. Previous literature indicates that effective 
communications among the team members is a key factor to project success (Suchan 
and Hayzak 2001). For open source development teams, to achieve the objectives and 
to successfully complete their development tasks, information must be effectively 
exchanged (Powell et al. 2003). Thus, we propose that the density of a project will 
negatively affect the level of development activities of a project: 
Hypothesis 3: Project density will negatively affect the level of project 
development activities. 
Project Density and Popularity: According to the definition of density, project density 
determines the readiness of a group in response to changes (Hanneman and Riddle 
2005). Higher density indicates a greater degree of interaction among the members in 
the process of making decisions (Hanneman and Riddle 2005; John Scott et al. 2005). 
In the case when a specific member cannot contribute, for e.g., the developer could not 
promptly respond to the feedbacks from end users such as bug fixing, support or feature 
requests, other members can take charge of his or her responsibility. The coordination 
of the development team as well as the response to the end users’ requests will not be 
greatly affected. Open source users usually put more attention on the continual 
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support and maintenance provided by the project teams. Sufficient maintenance and 
support of open source projects by developers typically generate positive reputation of 
such projects. Hence, the software users might also favor a project with high density. 
Therefore, a high density project will attract more end users and subsequently leading 
to an increased the level of popularity of the project: 
Hypothesis 4: Project density will positively affect the level of project popularity. 
Leadership Centrality and Development Activity: A project manager plays the key 
role of coordinating overall project development activity. As Lerner and Tirole (2002) 
pointed out, the project manager should carry out some critical tasks such as attracting 
new programmers, ensuring an efficient division of the project into modules, allowing 
contributors to perform their tasks independently from the rest of the contributors, and 
managing conflicting views and approaches among participants. In a project with 
higher leadership centrality, the manager has higher stature and more influence on the 
project team (Mehra et. all 2006). In high manager centrality projects, the managers 
can attract and communicate with many developers, and those developers may 
actively exchange information with their managers because of the manager’s stature 
and influence. Under such communication structures, developers derive the majority 
of necessary information and resources from the managers, and can perform their 
tasks independently from the other developers. The project manager thus serves as a 
pivotal conduit for information communication among the project team (Mehra et. al 
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2006). Mehra et. al (2006) also suggest that “when group leaders are centrally located 
within their groups, they can more successfully mobilize and direct group action 
toward the accomplishment of important group goals, and thereby enhance the 
objective performance of their groups.” Therefore, we propose that project leadership 
centrality will positively influence the level of development activity of the project: 
Hypothesis 5: Project leadership centrality will positively affect the level of 
project development activities. 
Furthermore, a project manager tends to simultaneously participates in more than one 
open source projects or is affiliated to other commercial projects. Through exposures 
in the multiple projects, she may get peer recognition or signal her talent to different 
colleagues. This is the so-called ego gratification incentive, which is one kind of 
singling incentive defined by Lerner and Tirole (2002). Economic theory (e.g., 
Holmstrom 1999) suggests that the stronger the signaling incentive, the more visible 
the performance to the peers; the higher the impact of effort on the performance; and 
the more informative the performance about talent (Lerner and Tirole 2002). Thus, the 
more projects the project manager participates in, the more visible the manager’s 
performance will be to other developers. As stated above, when the manager’s 
centrality is high, the manager has high stature and influence in this project (Mehra et. 
all 2006). The visibility of such positive reputation of managers to developers in other 
projects is thus enhanced if a manager participates in multiple projects. Therefore, we 
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propose that a leader’s heightened participation in other projects will yield a positive 
effect on the level of development activities for project teams with high leadership 
centrality: 
Hypothesis 6: Leader’s heightened participations in other projects will yield a 
positive effect on the level of project development activities for projects with high 
leadership centrality. 
Leadership Centrality and Popularity: In a project with higher leadership centrality, 
the manager has higher stature and more influence in the project team (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005), so that the manager takes charge of exchanging most information or 
resource among the project team members. However, heavy reliance on a single 
developer threatens the continual adoption or usage of OSS from end users who seek 
continuous support and maintenance from the project. A project manager typically has 
a limited amount of time and efforts to contribute to the projects (Hinds and Lee 
2008). Once the manager could not focus attention to the project, it will greatly affect 
the coordination of the development team as well as the response to the end users’ 
requests. These outcomes typically generate negative word of mouth which reduces the 
reputation of such projects. Given the increased likelihood of negative word of mouth 
and reputation in the OSS community, it is thus likely that the demand popularity of 
such projects among OSS end users decrease over time. Therefore, we propose that 
project leadership centrality will negatively influence the level of project popularity: 
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Hypothesis 7: Project leadership centrality will negatively affect the level of 
project popularity. 
Since the open source managers (including the developers) usually simultaneously 
participate in more than one project or are affiliated to other commercial projects, there 
are effort and time constraints on part of the individual developers’ fixed amount of 
resources and effort (Hinds and Lee 2008). The more projects the manager participates 
in, the more time and efforts are needed to contribute to the different projects. Thus, as 
much anecdotal evidence has indicated, heavily reliance on a single project manager 
threatens the survival of the open source projects. This may largely deter the users who 
want to seek continual consistent support and maintenance from OSS project teams. 
Therefore, we propose that a leader’s heightened participations in other projects will 
yield a negative effect on the level of project popularity for projects with high 
leadership centrality: 
Hypothesis 8: Leader’s heightened participations in other projects will yield a 
negative effect on the level of project popularity for projects with high leadership 
centrality. 
2.3.2 Project-Specific Characteristics and Project Success 
Apart from the communication pattern, project-specific factors may also influence the 
success of OSS projects. Project-specific characteristics considered in this study 
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include type of licenses, project complexity, programming language, project age, and 
target audience. 
Lerner and Tirole (2005) suggested that the restrictiveness of license protects the 
developers from being exploited by the commercial software firms by limiting the 
privatization of their intellectual products. From the viewpoint of the open source 
developers, commercialization of open source projects is undesirable because it can 
reduce the visibility of the developer’s contribution and reputation, which have been 
discovered to be one key incentive to participate in open source development (Lerner 
and Tirole 2005). Therefore, commercialization may drive away developers. Thus, we 
propose the restrictiveness of licenses may play a positive role on the level of OSS 
development activities. In addition, complex projects may deter some developers who 
would not like to pay much time on this project. OSS project developers, especially in 
the small OSS project, usually did not get monetary compensation from the projects. 
If the project is too complex, they need to spend much time on familiar with the 
project. Thus, we expect that a more complex project is likely to achieve a less level 
of development activities. 
Hypothesis 9A: A project with a restrictive license will be likely to achieve a 
higher level of development activities. 




From the end users’ perspective, software written in more popular programming 
languages may be more popular among end users, since more people can modify (or 
customize) the open source software. In addition, the popularity of an OSS project is 
likely to increase with a longer history of existence, because the longer the project has 
been developed and distributed in the open source community, the more users can find 
and adopt the OSS software. Finally, some open source projects are specifically 
developed for particular user groups. Apparently, software targeted at the general end 
users may appeal to more users, and thus leading to increased project popularity. Thus, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 10A: A project written in a popular programming language will be 
likely to achieve a higher level of popularity. 
Hypothesis 10B: A project with a longer time history will be likely to achieve a 
higher level of popularity. 
Hypothesis 10C: A project targeting at end users will be likely to achieve a higher 





2.4 Research Method 
The objective of this study is to investigate the longitudinal impacts of 
communication patterns of open source teams on project success. We collect data of 
various OSS projects over an extended period of 13 months and utilize cross-sectional 
time-series panel data analysis methods (Wooldridge 2003, Greene 2003). In this 
section, we elaborate the operational details such as project selection and 
measurement of indicators. 
2.4.1 Project Selection 
As with most empirical studies on open source projects, the data is collected from 
SourceForge.net, which is the world's largest online repository of open source 
applications. At the start of our data collection (in November 2006), SourceForge.net 
hosted 133,029 open source projects on a wide variety of areas, and had 1,425,354 
registered developers. SourceForge.net also provides useful tools to control and 
manage open source development. It offers a variety of services including hosting, 
mailing lists, bug tracking, patch tracking, support request tracking, feature request 
tracking, message boards, file archiving, and other project management tools. 
SourceForge.net provides a large sampling population of open source projects with 
extensive details, and thereby is the best site to collect data on open source projects’ 
development activities and attributes.  
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In order to investigate the communication patterns of the project teams, we observe and 
analyze the developers’ interactions through bug, patch, support request, and feature 
request (BPSF) tracking systems hosted on SourceForge.net. These tracking systems 
enable users and developers to report and discuss BPSF. Each report includes basic 
information about the BPSF as well as their correspondences that deal with bug fixing, 
patches updating, support and feature requests responding in time sequence.   
Figure 2.2 presents an example of the procedure for collecting data on the pattern of 
communication. First, on project’s summary page, we can see the links of bugs, patches, 
feature requests or support requests systems. Second, by clicking the link (e.g. bugs), 
we can see the list of bugs. Third, checking the details of each bug, we can find who 
submitted the bug and who responded to this bug. We define that the submitter and 
respondents have the interaction, which will be recorded in the sociomatrix. Each 
sociomatrix contains interaction information of each project per month. A sociomatrix 
is a standard data representation for a network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
The sociomatrix has a row and a column for each individual, and the cells of the matrix 
count the number of interactions from one individual to another. It can be constructed 




Not all projects on SourceForge.net are suitable for our study. Three criteria are adopted 
to select useful projects: projects are selected from top 7000 ranked projects; projects 
have at least three developers; and there are enough interactions to ensure that each 
sociomatrix is equal to or larger than 3 × 3 matrix. We choose projects with at least 
three developers because we are interested in team communications, instead of 
individual basis or dyadic interactions, which are not suitable for analyzing 
communication patterns. Although many projects have more than three developers, 
yet some projects do not make use of the SourceForge’s BPSF tracking system, which 
leaves us impossible to track the communications; some projects do not have enough 




bugs, or patches, or support requests, or feature requests to establish a non-null 
socio-matrix. We select only the top-ranked 7000 projects because in top 1000 
projects, ninety projects are useful; from top 1000 to top 2000, twenty-one projects 
are useful; from top 2000 to top 4000, ten projects are useful; from top 4000 to top 
7000, only five projects are useful. Therefore, we believe that there are few useful 
projects after the top-ranked 7000 projects.  
In the top ranked 7000 projects, 6815 projects were examined because the remaining 
185 projects were not ranked by the website. As shown in Figure 2.3, there were 3069 
projects with only one developer; there were 948 projects with two developers; 378 
projects did not have (bug, patch, support or feature request) tracking systems on 
SourceForge.net; 2294 projects did not have enough interactions. By excluding the 
unsuitable projects, the final sample was 126 projects. (The number of developers of 
these 126 projects ranges from 3 to 149.) In order to analyze the dynamic impacts of 
communication patterns on project success, we monitor each project over an extended 
period. Starting from 01 November 2006, we captured communication records (BPSF 
reports) of each project every month until 30 November 2007. We thus obtained data 




Projects in our data samples are right-truncated, because all the projects are still active 
by the end of data collection date (31 Nov 2007). Since the projects are selected from 
top 7000 ranked projects at the beginning of our data collection process, most selected 
projects were in the stable, relatively productive phases of project team evolution. 
Hence, it is not surprising that all the selected projects are still active by the end of the 
data collection date. In addition, there are two projects whose registration dates (26 Jan 
2007 and 04 Aug 2007) were later than the initial data collection date (01 Nov 2006). 
The other 124 projects’ registration dates were earlier than the initial data collection 
date. Hence, except for the two projects mentioned earlier, there were 124 projects in 
our data sample that were left-truncated. For most projects (124 out of 126 projects) in 
our data set, with left and right truncation, the window of our observational period of 13 
months is about a one-year snapshot of the projects’ entire life cycle. However, for our 
 



















observation period beyond the initial starting phases of the project teams’ formational 
beginnings, the performances of these projects are likely to be stable, relatively 
productive and can at least maintain a certain level of development activity and level of 
demand from end users. Through investigating a project’s communication patterns 
during the stable periods beyond the formational stages, we can more confidently 
generalize our research results into helping us to examine how the project teams work 
in the stable periods, and further uncover factors impacting the long term sustainability 
of OSS projects. Therefore, studying the projects’ communication patterns during the 
intermediate stable periods (between the starting and ending periods) helps researchers 
to understand and explain what factors influence the sustainability of these OSS 
projects. 
2.4.2 Measures 
Projects success is measured from both the supply side and demand side. For the supply 
side, development activity is calculated as the average number of total tracks and file 
releases. Number of total tracks includes sum of bugs, patches, support and feature 
requests. For the demand side, popularity is measured by the formula4: “number of web 
hits × (1+ subscription)”, in which “subscription” is measured by level of accepted 
donations of each project, and “web hits” are measured by the number of web traffic 
                                                 





visitations as recorded on SourceForge.net. Number of web hits indicates the flow of 
users. More users visiting the project’s website indicate a high level of popularity for 
the project. In addition, from the perspective of economic theory, rational users will 
invest on promising products with good potential to flourish in the future. A project 
with a high level of donations indicates that many users may regard it as a promising 
up-and-coming project. Therefore, the level of donations can also indicate the 
popularity of a project. In order to capture popularity more comprehensively, we adopt 
a composite measure5 of popularity as shown in the above formula. 
We use project centrality, project density and leadership centrality to describe 
communication patterns. Project centrality can be measured by project degree 
centrality. Project degree centrality describes the inequality or variance of developers’ 
contribution in the network (Freeman 1979). Project density is defined as the 
percentage of ties that exist in a network out of all possible ties. A density of 1 implies 
that every actor is connected to every other actor. A density of 0 implies that no actor 
knows any other actor. Leadership centrality indicates the stature and influence of the 
project leader, which can be measured by centrality of the project administrator or 
average centrality of the project administrators if there is more than one administrator. 
In order to moderate the effect of the leadership centrality, we include the moderating 
variable of the extent of leader’s participations in other projects. It is defined as the 
                                                 
5 We also apply single measure (web hits and subscription respectively) in the estimation. The regression 
results show that the composite measurement is more comprehensive.  
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average number of projects that project administrators (within a project) participate 
simultaneously. We import interaction data from SourceForge’s BPSF tracking systems 
to create a sociomatrix for each project per month. By analyzing each socio-matrix 
through the popular social network software Ucinet 6.0, we can obtain the data of 
project centrality, density and leadership centrality.  
There are several project-specific factors that may also influence the success of the 
project. We measure the types of licenses according to license categories classified by 
Lerner and Tirole (2002). A value of 1 indicates a restrictive license; 0 indicates a 
nonrestrictive license. Project complexity is measured by the number of software 
packages. Project age is defined as the months between the data collection date and the 
project registration date. In addition, a dummy variable is included to control for 
whether the project uses C/C++, which is one of the largest and most popular 
programming language categories on SourceForge.net. Finally, a dummy variable is 
employed to indicate whether the project is targeted at general end users. 
2.5 Results and Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics: The development activity in terms of the numbers of tracks 
including bugs, patches, support and feature requests ranges from 0 to 358 and the 
average is 26.809. Project popularity in terms of the number of web hits ranges from 0 
to 91.480 10×  and the average is 71.688 10× . The average project centrality of our 
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sample projects is 49.8% and ranges from 0 to 100%. The average density is 22.8% and 
ranges from 0 to 100%. The average leadership centrality is 50.5% and ranges from 0 to 
100%. The leaders simultaneously participate in 3.128 projects on average. The 
complexity of project ranges from 1 working package to 22 packages. The age of 
project ranges from -9.1 months6 to 95.467 months. The descriptive statistics of all 
variables is shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Social Network Graphs: In order to better understand the communication patterns, we 
compare examples of communication graphs of an open source project (project “YUI 
Library”) in four of the thirteen months7 (See Figure 2.4). In Dec 2006, YUI Library’s 
project centrality is 33.7%, project density is 7.0%, and leadership centrality is 26.8%. 
In Apr 2007, project centrality is 59.6%, project density is 6.5%, and leadership 
                                                 
6 Negative project age is because the registration date was later than the project collection date 
7 Because of space limitation, the whole communication graphs in thirteen months of project “YUL 
Library” are shown in Appendix.  
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of All Variable  
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Activity 26.809 34.443 0.000 358.000
Log Activity 1.152 0.526 -0.301 2.554
Popularity 71.688 10× 81.170 10× 0.000 91.480 10×
Log Popularity 5.004 1.615 0.000 9.171
Project Centrality 0.498 0.305 0.000 1.000
Project Density 0.228 0.180 0.000 1.000
Leadership Centrality  0.505 0.330 0.000 1.000
Participation 3.128 2.488 1.000 15.000
Complexity 4.095 3.712 1.000 22.000
Licence 0.750 0.433 0.000 1.000
Project Age 55.132 25.482 -9.100 95.467
Target Audience 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000
Programming Language 0.614 0.487 0.000 1.000
Developers 23.213 24.319 3.000 149.000
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centrality is 51.9%. In Aug 2007, project centrality is 73.6%, project density is 3.4%, 
and leadership centrality is 75.7%. In Oct 2007, project centrality is 68.8%, project 
density is 4.9%, and leadership centrality is 71.6%. In Figure 2.5, we draw the graphs of 
average project centrality, density and leadership centrality over the 13 months for all 
projects in our data sample. We find that distinct variations in measures of project 













2.5.1 Econometric Models  
The proposed empirical models for a project i’s development activity and popularity in 
time period t are: 
i t 1 i t 2 i t 3 i t
4 i t 5 i
6 i t
Activity  = α  Popularity  + α  Project_Centrality  + α Project_Density
              + α  Leadership_Centrality  + α  Participation  
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Where itν  is the model residual error term. it i t itν μ λ ε= + +  in which iμ  refers to 
project-specific dummy, tλ  refers to time-specific dummy, and itε refers to random 
error term.  
By looking at the histograms of dependent variables (development activity and 
popularity) and some independent variables (project centrality, density, and leadership 
centrality) (shown in Figure 2.6), it appears that the dependent variables are skewed to 
the left and not normally distributed. Accordingly, we specify the dependent variables 
in logarithmic forms in the regression analysis. 
We measure the success of OSS projects from both the supply side and demand side. It 
is widely acknowledged that the supply and demand of goods are endogenous and 
would influence each other simultaneously over time. To account for the simultaneity 
issue, we estimate the parameters of our research model by using the simultaneous 
equation modeling and estimation approach. We consider Three-Stage Least Squares 
(3SLS) estimation method (Wooldridge 2003, Greene 2003). 3SLS is the two-stage 
least squares version of the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method. It is an 
appropriate technique when right-hand side variables are correlated with the error terms, 
and there is both heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the residuals. 
Such an estimation technique accounts for the simultaneity of the demand (popularity) 
and supply (development activity) factors and thus minimizes the bias in the estimated 
parameters of the proposed model. 
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In our model, we considered some project-specific characteristics as control variables. 
However, what we accounted for in the model are the most salient project-specific 
attributes. Some other project-specific factors, such as data base environment, 
development status, operating systems, project topic, and user interface may also have 
impacts on the success of OSS projects. Those project-specific factors that do not 
change over time and which are unobserved to the researcher, are generally referred to 
as unobserved attributes or heterogeneity. In order to account for the impact of such 
unobserved attributes of the projects on the model’s dependent variables, we utilize 
the fixed effects model estimation approach, that is, we include project dummies to 
estimate the model using the 3SLS method. In addition, the data was collected over 
time. There may be unobserved time-specific effects across different time periods. 
Thus, we not only include project dummies in our estimation model but also time 
period dummies. 
The social network measures such as project centrality, project density and leadership 
centrality have potential endogeneity issues. To solve the potential endogeneity bias 
of the estimated model parameters, we apply lagged network measures (network 
variables measured in some earlier periods) as the instruments for the network 
measures. For example, we adopt project centrality measured in some earlier periods 
as the instrumental variables for current period’s project centrality measure:
i, t-1Project_Centrality , i, t-2Project_Centrality , i, t-3Project_Centrality , i, t-4Project_Centrality  and 
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i, t-5Project_Centrality ; project density measured in some earlier periods as the 
instruments for current period’s project density: i, t-1Project_Density , i, t-2Project_Density , 
i, t-3Project_Density , i, t-4Project_Density  and i, t-5Project_Density ; leadership centrality 
measured in some earlier periods as the instruments for current period’s leadership 
centrality: i, t-1Leadership_Centrality , i, t-2Leadership_Centrality , i, t-3Leadership_Centrality , i, t-4Leadership_Centrality  
and i, t-5Leadership_Centrality ; the instruments for interaction effect of leadership centrality 
and participation are: i, t-1 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-2 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× ,
i, t-3 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-4 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-5 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× . 
Table 2.2 shows the main estimation results, in which we take into account project 
and time period fixed effects, simultaneity issues of popularity and development 
activity, and endogeneity issues of network communication measures. Before 
discussing the results of our hypotheses test using model estimation results in Table 






Table 2.2 Main Estimation Results  
Observations: 1004 
 Coef. S.E. z p>|z| 
Log Activity  
Log Popularity 1.506*** 0.268 5.630 0.000
Project Centrality 0.026 0.387 0.070 0.947
Project Density -2.176*** 0.475 -4.580 0.000
Leadership Centrality 1.402*** 0.389 3.600 0.000
Participation 0.469*** 0.092 5.080 0.000
Leadership Centrality * Participation 0.199*** 0.052 3.860 0.000
Project Complexity -0.166*** 0.034 -4.900 0.000
Licence (Restrictive) 10.792*** 1.871 5.770 0.000
 2R =0.312 
Log Popularity  
Log Activity 0.631*** 0.073 8.690 0.000
Project Centrality -0.366* 0.187 -1.950 0.051
Project Density 1.824*** 0.217 8.420 0.000
Leadership Centrality -0.845*** 0.195 -4.340 0.000
Participation 0.009 0.013 0.710 0.479
Leadership Centrality * Participation -0.101*** 0.025 -3.970 0.000
Project Age 0.015*** 0.001 15.620 0.000
Programming Language (C/C++) 0.262*** 0.064 4.100 0.000
Target Audience (end user) 0.386*** 0.095 4.060 0.000
 2R =0.968 
Project Centrality 
Project Centrality (-1)  0.288*** 0.023 12.550 0.000
Project Centrality (-2) 0.187*** 0.024 7.920 0.000
Project Centrality (-3) 0.093*** 0.027 3.450 0.001
Project Centrality (-4) 0.095*** 0.028 3.420 0.001
Project Centrality (-5) 0.042 0.027 1.550 0.122
 2R =0.145  
Project Density 
Project Density (-1) 0.221*** 0.024 9.110 0.000
Project Density (-2) 0.170*** 0.024 7.040 0.000
Project Density (-3) 0.116*** 0.025 4.650 0.000
Project Density (-4) 0.113*** 0.025 4.550 0.000
Project Density (-5) 0.081*** 0.025 3.180 0.001
 2R =0.108  
Leadership Centrality  
Leadership Centrality (-1) 0.299*** 0.020 15.180 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-2) 0.226*** 0.020 11.080 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-3) 0.143*** 0.022 6.380 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-4) 0.117*** 0.023 5.160 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-5) 0.105*** 0.022 4.820 0.000
 2R =0.345  
Leadership*Participation  
Leadership Centrality (-1) * Participation 0.248*** 0.023 10.990 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-2) * Participation 0.227*** 0.024 9.580 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-3) * Participation 0.190*** 0.024 7.990 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-4) * Participation 0.243*** 0.023 10.410 0.000
Leadership Centrality (-5) * Participation 0.051** 0.024 2.150 0.031
 2R =0.590  
   
Note: 1. Full table including the coefficients and statistics of month dummies and project dummies 
are shown in Appendix. 2. Significance: 10% *; 5% **; 0.01% *** 
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2.5.2 Robustness Checks  
To strengthen the rigor of our work, we perform multiple robustness checks for 
simultaneity bias of popularity and development activity, endogeneity bias of network 
measures, and different measurements of popularity and development activity.  
Robustness Check for Simultaneity Bias: Table 2.3 shows the statistics of robustness 
check for simultaneity bias of popularity and development activity. We compare the 
results from three estimations: (I) SB1: we first estimate a basic model using OLS 
without considering simultaneity of popularity and development activity and by 
Table 2.3 Robustness Check: Simultaneity Bias  
 SB1 SB2 SB3 
Observations 1627 1627 1627 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Log Activity       
Log Popularity 0.028*** 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.100*** 0.015
Project Centrality 0.644*** 0.055 0.659*** 0.058 0.306*** 0.044
Project Density -0.971*** 0.074 -0.993*** 0.080 -0.462*** 0.061
Leadership Centrality 0.215*** 0.065 0.206*** 0.066 0.567*** 0.061
Participation -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.007 -0.036*** 0.009
Leadership * Participation -0.024* 0.013 -0.023* 0.013 -0.036*** 0.012
Project Complexity 0.032*** 0.003 0.032*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.005
Licence  -0.035 0.027 -0.031 0.027 0.118 0.089
 2R = 0.250 2R = 0.249 2R =0.699 
Log Popularity    
Log Activity 0.294*** 0.078 -0.127 0.313 1.444*** 0.088
Project Centrality 0.886*** 0.180 1.169*** 0.273 -0.402*** 0.078
Project Density -1.265*** 0.247 -1.729*** 0.418 0.530*** 0.099
Leadership Centrality -0.495** 0.207 -0.403* 0.219 -0.694*** 0.092
Participation -0.036 0.024 -0.035 0.024 0.056*** 0.012
Leadership*participation 0.026 0.043 0.019 0.043 0.045*** 0.018
Project Age 0.022*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.008
Programming Language 0.082 0.077 0.053 0.095 -0.087 0.111
Target Audience 0.474*** 0.077 0.498*** 0.090 0.455*** 0.102
 2R =  0.199 2R = 0.184 2R = 0.928 
    
Note: 1. The coefficients and statistics of month dummies and project dummies are omitted because of 




excluding project and month fixed effects; (II) SB2: we adopt 3SLS to account for 
potential simultaneity bias without including project and month fixed effects; (III) 
SB3: we estimate a model using 3SLS accounting for simultaneity bias and by 
including project and month fixed effects.  
Compared results across SB1, SB2 and SB3, the model coefficients’ magnitudes vary 
considerably if simultaneity of popularity and development activity are accounted for 
and if project and time fixed effects are included in both the activity and popularity 
models. Some signs of other variables (project centrality, project density, leadership 
centrality, and leadership centrality × participation) are changed in the popularity 
model. For example, in the activity model, the coefficient magnitude of popularity ( 1α ) 
in SB3 is five times larger than that of in SB1 or SB2 ( 1α =0.100 in SB3, 1α =0.028 in 
SB1 and 1α =0.015 in SB2); the coefficient magnitudes of project centrality ( 2α ) and 
project density ( 3α ) in SB3 are around half less than those of in SB1 or SB2 ( 2α
=0.306 in SB3, 2α =0.644 in SB1 and 2α =0.659 in SB2; 3α =-0.462 in SB3, 3α
=-0.971 in SB1 and 3α =-0.993 in SB2). In another example, for the popularity model, 
the signs of project centrality ( 2β ) and project density ( 3β ) in SB3 are different from 
those in SB1 or SB2 ( 2β =-0.402 in SB3, 2β =0.886 in SB1 and 2β =1.169 in SB2; 3β
=0.530 in SB3, 3β =-1.265 in SB1 and 3β =-1.729 in SB2). In addition, R-Squares in 
SB3 are much larger than those in SB1 or SB2 (in the activity model, 2R =0.699 in 
SB3, 2R =0.250 in SB1, and 2R =0.249 in SB2; in the popularity model, 2R =0.928 in 
SB3, 2R =0.199 in SB1, and 2R =0.184 in SB2). These large differences are due to 
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the unobserved effects of projects and time periods. There are some time-consistent 
factors, such as data base environment, operating systems, project topic, user interface 
and so on, which we do not consider in the regression. They may have the impact on 
success of OSS projects. Without considering these factors, the model coefficients 
would be inaccurately estimated. For example, if we do not consider project and time 
fixed effects, the results from 3SLS (SB2) show that there is no significant effects 
between popularity and development activity ( 1α =0.015 and p=0.407; 1β =-0.127 and 
p=0.684). However, from OLS (SB1), results show that popularity and development 
activity are highly related (both 1α and 1β  are significant at 1% confidence interval in 
SB1). Therefore, the estimated model parameters from both SB1 and SB2 are biased. 
Although we consider both simultaneity and fixed effects in SB3, the estimation may 
still be biased because there are possible endogeneity issues in the models.  
Robustness Check for Endogeneity Bias: Table 2.4 shows the results of robustness 
check for endogeneity bias of network measures. All the estimations in Table 2.4 have 
considered simultaneity issue and project and month fixed effects. (I) EB1: we list the 
estimation results based on the basic 3SLS model (which is the same as SB3); (II) 
EB2: we use lagged network measures (network measures in the immediate past one 
period) as the independent variables in the regression. Thus, we use i, t-1Project_Centrality , 
i, t-1Project_Density , i, t-1Leadership_Centrality , i, t-1 iLeadership_Centrality Participation×  together 
with other project control variables as the independent variables; (III) EB3: we apply 
lagged network measures as the instrumental variables for the network measures. The 
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Table 2.4 Robustness Check: Endogeneity Bias 
 EB1 EB2 EB3 
Observations 1627 1503 879 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Log Activity       
Log Popularity 0.100*** 0.015 0.104*** 0.016 1.839*** 0.282
Project Centrality 0.306*** 0.044 0.148*** 0.049 -0.129 0.325
Project Density -0.462*** 0.061 -0.193*** 0.068 -0.673**  0.328
Leadership Centrality 0.567*** 0.061 0.267*** 0.067 0.642* 0.362
Participation -0.036*** 0.009 -0.053*** 0.010 -0.182***  0.016
Leadership * Participation -0.036*** 0.012 -0.025* 0.013 0.105***  0.036
Project Complexity 0.014*** 0.005 0.017*** 0.005 -0.199*** 0.033
Licence 0.118 0.089 0.064 0.098 4.149*** 0.833
 2R = 0.699 2R = 0.654 2R =0.577  
Log Popularity    
Log Activity 1.444*** 0.088 1.498*** 0.103 0.458***  0.066
Project Centrality -0.402*** 0.078 -0.195** 0.080 -0.112  0.144
Project Density 0.530*** 0.099 0.188* 0.105 0.682*** 0.140
Leadership Centrality -0.694*** 0.092 -0.269*** 0.098 -0.468***  0.159
Participation 0.056*** 0.012 0.075*** 0.013 -0.022* 0.013
Leadership*Participation 0.045*** 0.018 0.027 0.019 -0.032** 0.016
Project Age 0.009*** 0.008 0.010*** 0.002 0.073*** 0.003
Programming Language -0.087 0.111 -0.036 0.125 -4.309***  0.156
Target Audience 0.455*** 0.102 0.454*** 0.112 1.797*** 0.075
 2R =  0.928 2R = 0.917 2R = 0.988  
Project Centrality    
Project Centrality (-1) --- ---  0.280*** 0.025
Project Centrality (-2) --- ---  0.184*** 0.025
Project Centrality (-3) --- ---  0.073** 0.030
Project Centrality (-4) --- ---  0.146*** 0.032
Project Centrality (-5) --- ---  0.033 0.032
Project Centrality (-6) --- ---  -0.018 0.030
Project Density   
Project Density (-1) --- ---  0.217*** 0.027
Project Density (-2) --- ---  0.184*** 0.027
Project Density (-3) --- ---  0.103*** 0.028
Project Density (-4) --- ---  0.141*** 0.028
Project Density (-5) --- ---  0.039 0.028
Project Density (-6) --- ---  0.023 0.028
Leadership Centrality   
Leadership Centrality (-1) --- ---  0.299*** 0.021
Leadership Centrality (-2) --- ---  0.199*** 0.022
Leadership Centrality (-3) --- ---  0.114*** 0.024
Leadership Centrality (-4) --- ---  0.159*** 0.025
Leadership Centrality (-5) --- ---  0.095*** 0.025
Leadership Centrality (-6) --- ---  0.042* 0.024
Leadership*participation   
Leader_Cent(-1)*Part --- ---  0.249*** 0.025
Leader_Cent(-2)*Part --- ---  0.184*** 0.026
Leader_Cent(-3)*Part --- ---  0.148*** 0.027
Leader_Cent(-4)*Part --- ---  0.325*** 0.027
Leader_Cent(-5)*Part --- ---  0.042 0.027
Leader_Cent(-6)*Part --- ---  0.017 0.025
   
Note: 1. The coefficients and statistics of month dummies and project dummies are omitted because 
of space limitation; 2. Significance: 10% *; 5% **; 0.01% *** 
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instruments for project centrality are i, t-1Project_Centrality , i, t-2Project_Centrality , 
i, t-3Project_Centrality , i, t-4Project_Centrality , i, t-5Project_Centrality , i, t-6Project_Centrality ; the 
instruments for project density are i, t-1Project_Density , i, t-2Project_Density , i, t-3Project_Density , 
i, t-4Project_Density , i, t-5Project_Density , i, t-6Project_Density ; the instruments for leadership 
centrality are i, t-1Leadership_Centrality , i, t-2Leadership_Centrality , i, t-3Leadership_Centrality ,
i, t-4Leadership_Centrality , i, t-5Leadership_Centrality , i, t-6Leadership_Centrality ; the instruments for 
interaction effect of leadership centrality and participation are: 
i, t-1 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-2 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-3 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× ,
i, t-4 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-5 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× , i, t-6 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× . 
In EB1 and EB2, development activity and popularity are treated as endogenous 
variables. The only difference is that lagged network measures are used as exogenous 
variables in EB2. We find that the signs and significance of the variables do not 
change too much in EB1 and EB2, except that the coefficient magnitudes of lagged 
network measures (in EB2) are much lower than those of original network measures 
(in EB1). For example, in the activity model, the coefficient of project centrality 2α
=0.306 in EB1 and the coefficient of lagged project centrality ( i, t-1Project_Centrality ) 2α
=0.148 in EB2; the coefficient of project density 3α =-0.462 in EB1 and lagged 
project density ( i, t-1Project_Density ) 3α =-0.193 in EB2; the coefficient of leadership 
centrality 4α =0.567 in EB1 and lagged leadership centrality ( i, t-1Leadership_Centrality ) 4α
=0.267 in EB2. Similarly, in the popularity model, the coefficient of project centrality
2β =-0.402 in EB1 and lagged project centrality 2β =-0.195 in EB2; the coefficient of 
59 
 
project density 3β =0.530 in EB1 and lagged project density 3β =0.188 in EB2; the 
coefficient of leadership centrality 4β =-0.694 in EB1 and lagged leadership centrality 
4β =-0.269 in EB2.  
EB3 is fairly different from EB1 and EB2. Besides development activity and 
popularity, network measures such as project centrality, project density, leadership 
centrality and interaction effect of leadership centrality and participation are also set 
as endogenous variables in EB3. The coefficient magnitude, significance and signs in 
EB3 differ greatly when comparing with EB1 and EB2. For example, the effect of 
popularity on development activity ( 1α ) in EB3 is much larger than that in EB1 or 
EB2 ( 1α =1.839 in EB3, 1α =0.100 in EB1, and 1α =0.104 in EB2); on the contrary, 
the effect of development activity on popularity ( 1β ) in EB3 is much lower than that 
in EB1 or EB2 ( 1β =0.458 in EB3, 1β =1.444 in EB1, and 1β =1.498 in EB2). For 
another example, the signs of project complexity ( 7α ) and interaction effect of 
leadership centrality and participation ( 6α  or 6β ) in EB3 are different from the signs 
of those in EB1 or EB2 ( 7α =-0.199 in EB3, 7α =0.014 in EB1 and 7α =0.017 in EB2; 
6α =0.105 in EB3, 6α =-0.036 in EB1 and 6α =-0.025 in EB2; 6β =-0.032 in EB3, 6β
=0.045 in EB1 and 6β =0.027 in EB2). In addition, the effect of project centrality on 
development activity ( 2α ) is insignificant in EB3 ( 2α =-0.129, p=0.691), but 
significant at 1% confidence interval in EB1 or EB2; the effect of project centrality on 
popularity ( 2β ) is also insignificant in EB3 ( 2β =-0.112, p=0.437), but significant in 
EB1 or EB2.  
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These large differences between EB1, EB2 and EB3 can be attributed to the 
endogeneity of network measures (i.e. project centrality, project density and 
leadership centrality). Estimated model coefficients in EB1 are biased because the 
endogeneity of network measures is not considered. Results in EB2 are also biased. 
We use lagged network measures ( i, t-1Project_Centrality , i, t-1Project_Density ,
i, t-1Leadership_Centrality ) to substitute original network measures ( i tProject_Centrality ,
i tProject_Density , i tLeadership_Centrality ) as the independent variables. However, these 
lagged network measures underestimate the impact of communication patterns on the 
project success, because they neglect the effect of communication patterns over 
multiple successive past periods that plays an importance role in determining current 
project success. In EB3, the original network measures are endogenous. We adopt 
lagged network measures as the instruments for the original network measures. We 
stop at using lagged measures up to lag=-6. There are two reasons that we choose the 
lag from -1 to -6. First, the more lags we adopt, the more observations are dropped 
from the estimation sample. When we do not use lagged variables, we have 1627 
observations in the estimation (in EB1); when we use lagged variables (lag=-1, -2, …, 
-6), we have only 879 observations left (in EB3). Second, when we choose the lag 
from -1 to -6 as the instruments of network measures, we find that the instruments 
with lag=-6 (e.g. i, t-6Project_Centrality , i, t-6Project_Density , i, t-6Leadership_Centrality , 
i, t-6 iLeadership_Centrality Participation× ) are not statistically correlated with the original 
network measures (shown in Table 2.4). Thus, EB3 is still biased because of using 
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more lags as the instruments. Hence, we choose instruments with the lag from -1 to -5 
in our main results (as shown Table 2.2).  
Compared with EB3, the coefficient magnitude, significance and signs of the 
variables in the main results (“MR” in short) differ somewhat. For example, the 
coefficient magnitudes of project density ( 3α  or 3β ), leadership centrality ( 4α  or 
4β ), and interaction effect of leadership centrality and participation ( 6α  or 6β ) in 
MR are much larger than those in EB3 (In the activity model, 3α =-2.176 in MR and 
3α =-0.673 in EB3; 4α =1.402 in MR and 4α =0.642 in EB3; 6α =0.199 in MR and 
6α =0.105 in EB3. In the popularity model: 3β =1.824 in MR and 3β =0.682 in EB3; 
4β =-0.845 in MR and 4β =-0.468 in EB3; 6β =-0.101 in MR and -0.032 in EB3). The 
sign of project centrality ( 2α ) in the activity model in MR is different from that in 
EB3 ( 2α =0.026 in MR and 2α =-0.129 in EB3) although the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. In addition, the effect of project centrality on the popularity 
is significant at 10% confidence interval in MR ( 2β =-0.366, p=0.051), but 
insignificant in EB3 ( 2β =-0.112, p=0.437).  
Robustness Check for Measures of Dependent Variables: At last, we show the 
robustness checks for the different measures of dependent variables in Table 2.5 and 
Table 2.6. We adopt a composite measure of each dependent variable in the main 
estimation. Development activity is measured by the average number of total tracks and 
file releases. Popularity is measured by the formula: “number of web hits × (1+ 
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Table 2.5 Robustness Check: Development Activity 
 DA1 DA2 
Observations 999 352 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Log Activity  
Log Popularity 3.163*** 0.599 -3.090** 1.265
Project Centrality -0.173 0.866 0.066 0.567
Project Density -5.767*** 1.091 -1.877 1.659
Leadership Centrality 4.370*** 0.910 -0.787 1.372
Participation 1.065*** 0.208 0.387 0.375
Leadership Centrality * Participation 0.460*** 0.118 0.241 0.239
Project Complexity -0.341*** 0.076 0.158*** 0.058
Licence  23.255*** 4.193 -9.478** 3.752
 2R =0.163 2R =0.622 
Log Popularity  
Log Activity 0.285*** 0.033 -0.079** 0.037
Project Centrality -0.286 0.188 0.058 0.128
Project Density 2.044*** 0.224 1.469*** 0.323
Leadership Centrality -1.156*** 0.208 -1.183*** 0.250
Participation 0.016 0.017 0.101** 0.041
Leadership Centrality * Participation -0.106*** 0.026 -0.078 0.055
Project Age 0.025*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.003
Programming Language  -0.781*** 0.086 0.360** 0.184
Target Audience -0.592*** 0.089 0.998*** 0.221
 2R =0.960 2R =0.980 
Project Centrality 
Project Centrality (-1)  0.284*** 0.023 0.377*** 0.039
Project Centrality (-2) 0.190*** 0.024 0.140*** 0.039
Project Centrality (-3) 0.094*** 0.027 0.156*** 0.052
Project Centrality (-4) 0.106*** 0.028 -0.009 0.052
Project Centrality (-5) 0.031 0.027 0.049 0.052
Project Density 
Project Density (-1) 0.220*** 0.024 0.258*** 0.044
Project Density (-2) 0.177*** 0.024 0.180*** 0.045
Project Density (-3) 0.116*** 0.025 0.202*** 0.049
Project Density (-4) 0.117*** 0.025 0.018 0.047
Project Density (-5) 0.077*** 0.025 0.049 0.047
Leadership Centrality  
Leadership Centrality (-1) 0.297*** 0.020 0.364*** 0.033
Leadership Centrality (-2) 0.228*** 0.020 0.239*** 0.033
Leadership Centrality (-3) 0.145*** 0.022 0.204*** 0.041
Leadership Centrality (-4) 0.126*** 0.022 0.002 0.040
Leadership Centrality (-5) 0.092*** 0.022 0.118*** 0.039
Leadership*Participation  
Leadership Centrality (-1) * Participation 0.240*** 0.022 0.285*** 0.037
Leadership Centrality (-2) * Participation 0.237*** 0.024 0.308*** 0.035
Leadership Centrality (-3) * Participation 0.194*** 0.024 0.278*** 0.038
Leadership Centrality (-4) * Participation 0.253*** 0.023 -0.015 0.033
Leadership Centrality (-5) * Participation 0.038 0.024 0.154*** 0.031
  
Note: 1. The coefficients and statistics of month dummies and project dummies are omitted because of 
space limitation; 2. Significance: 10% *; 5% **; 0.01% *** 
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Table 2.6 Robustness Check: Project Popularity 
 PP1 PP2 
Observations 1004 1004 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Log Activity  
Log Popularity 0.654*** 0.116 -0.005 0.009
Project Centrality 0.026 0.387 -0.583 0.374
Project Density -2.176*** 0.475 -0.491 0.430
Leadership Centrality 1.403*** 0.389 0.992*** 0.373
Participation 0.260*** 0.056 -0.079*** 0.017
Leadership Centrality * Participation 0.199*** 0.052 0.172*** 0.050
Project Complexity 0.304*** 0.063 0.024** 0.010
Licence  0.344 0.419 -0.258 0.271
 2R =0.312  2R =0.589 
Log Popularity  
Log Activity 1.453*** 0.167 0.000*** 0.000
Project Centrality -0.843* 0.431 0.000 0.000
Project Density 4.199*** 0.499 0.000*** 0.000
Leadership Centrality -1.946*** 0.448 0.000*** 0.000
Participation 0.022 0.030 -0.616*** 0.000
Leadership Centrality * Participation -0.232*** 0.058 0.000*** 0.000
Project Age 0.034*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.000
Programming Language  0.603*** 0.147 7.695*** 0.000
Target Audience  0.888*** 0.219 -0.964*** 0.000
 2R =0.961 2R =1.000 
Project Centrality 
Project Centrality (-1)  0.288*** 0.023 0.283*** 0.023
Project Centrality (-2) 0.187*** 0.024 0.184*** 0.024
Project Centrality (-3) 0.093*** 0.027 0.089*** 0.027
Project Centrality (-4) 0.095*** 0.028 0.101*** 0.028
Project Centrality (-5) 0.042 0.027 0.045 0.027
Project Density 
Project Density (-1) 0.221*** 0.024 0.209*** 0.025
Project Density (-2) 0.170*** 0.024 0.171*** 0.025
Project Density (-3) 0.116*** 0.025 0.135*** 0.026
Project Density (-4) 0.113*** 0.025 0.137*** 0.026
Project Density (-5) 0.081*** 0.025 0.063** 0.026
Leadership Centrality  
Leadership Centrality (-1) 0.299*** 0.020 0.301*** 0.020
Leadership Centrality (-2) 0.226*** 0.020 0.218*** 0.021
Leadership Centrality (-3) 0.143*** 0.022 0.141*** 0.023
Leadership Centrality (-4) 0.117*** 0.023 0.123*** 0.023
Leadership Centrality (-5) 0.105*** 0.022 0.109*** 0.022
Leadership*Participation  
Leadership Centrality (-1) * Participation 0.248*** 0.023 0.250*** 0.022
Leadership Centrality (-2) * Participation 0.227*** 0.024 0.218*** 0.024
Leadership Centrality (-3) * Participation 0.190*** 0.024 0.190*** 0.024
Leadership Centrality (-4) * Participation 0.243*** 0.023 0.241*** 0.023
Leadership Centrality (-5) * Participation 0.051** 0.024 0.060** 0.024
   
Note: 1. The coefficients and statistics of month dummies and project dummies are omitted because 




subscription)”. In order to show that these composite measures are more appropriate 
than the single measurements, we compare the estimation results when dependent 
variables are measured by a single element under the same settings of our main results 
(shown in Table 2.2). In Table 2.5, DA1 shows the results when development activity is 
measured by the number of total tracks; DA2 shows the results when development 
activity is measured by the number of file releases. In Table 2.6, PP1 shows the results 
when project popularity is measured by the number of web hits; PP2 shows the results 
when project popularity is measured by the level of subscriptions. 8 
In DA1, the coefficient magnitudes of some variables (project density 3α , leadership 
centrality 4α  and interaction effect of leadership centrality and participation 6α ) in 
the activity model are larger than those in MR ( 3α =-2.176 in MR and 3α =-5.767 in 
DA1; 4α =1.402 in MR and 4α =4.370 in DA1; 6α =0.199 in MR and 6α =0.460 in 
DA1). However, the effect of project centrality on the popularity is insignificant in 
DA1 ( 2β =-0.286, p=0.130), but significant at 10% confidence interval in MR ( 2β
=-0.366, p=0.051). In addition, the signs of some variables in DA1 are unreasonable. 
For example, the effect of programming language ( 8β ) or target audience ( 9β ) on 
popularity is significantly negative ( 8β =-0.781, 9β =-0.592). From the end users’ 
perspective, software written in more popular programming languages may be more 
popular among end users, since more people can modify (or customize) the open source 
                                                 
8 In Table 5, project popularity is still captured by the multiple measures of web hits and subscription; in 
Table 6, development activity is still measured by the average number of total tracks and file releases 
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software conveniently. Apparently, software targeted at the general end users may 
appeal to more users, and thus leading to increased project popularity. Therefore, 
compared with DA1 and MR, estimation in MR is more appropriate.  
In DA2, the effects of network measures such as project centrality ( 2α ), project 
density ( 3α ), leadership centrality ( 4α ) and interaction effect of leadership centrality 
and participation ( 6α ) on the development activity are statistically insignificant ( 2α
=0.066, p=0.970; 3α =-1.877, p=0.258; 4α =-0.787, p=0.566; 6α =0.241, p=0.313). 
Moreover, the relationship between development activity and popularity is improper. 
The effect of popularity on development activity ( 1α =-3.090) is significantly negative 
at 5% confidence interval; the effect of development activity on popularity ( 1β =-0.079) 
is also significantly negative at 5% confidence interval. Therefore, compared with 
DA2 and MR, estimated model coefficients in MR are more logical from a face 
validity point of view. 
In PP1, the effect of type of licence on the activity is statistically insignificant ( 8α
=0.344, p=0.411); the sign of project complexity is significantly positive at 1% 
confidence interval ( 7α =0.304). However, we expect that a more complex project is 
likely to achieve a less level of development activities because if the project is too 
complex, the users or developers need to spend much time and resources on the 
project per output delivered. In PP2, coefficients of many network variables are 
statistically insignificant and many signs of estimated parameters are unreasonable. 
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Apparently, the effects of network measures on the level of subscriptions are not 
significant. Therefore, estimated model parameters in MR are still more appropriate 
and valid than those given in PP1 or PP2.  
In summary, through the above analysis of robustness checks, we find that it is 
necessary to estimate our empirical models by accounting for project and time period 
fixed effects, simultaneity issues of popularity and development activity, endogeneity 
issues of network measures, and adopting composite measures of development 
activity and popularity, which are shown in Table 2.2. We discuss our hypotheses test 
results with regard to model estimation results (listed in Table 2.2) in the next section.  
2.5.3 Hypothesis Test 
Project Centrality and Success: Based on the estimation results, we find significant 
effects of communication patterns on our project success measures. H1 proposes that 
project centrality will positively affect the level of project development activities. H2 
proposes that project centrality will negatively affect the level of project popularity. 
Our results provide some support for these hypotheses. In the activity model, we find 
a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient of project centrality ( 2α =0.026, 
p=0.947), but in popularity model, we find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of project centrality ( 2β =-0.366, p=0.051), although significant at only the 
10% confidence interval. Thus, H1 is not supported, but H2 is marginally supported. 
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After we apply lagged network instruments, the observations are largely reduced, 
from 1627 observations without considering lagged network instruments to 1004 
observations after applying lagged instruments. More than one third of observations 
are missing, which may result in the insignificant effect of project centrality on 
development activity. For example, in EB1, there are no missing observations (1627 
observations in EB1). The effects of project centrality on both development activity 
and popularity are significant at 1% confidence interval. In EB2, there are 124 
missing observations because of one-lag variables (1503 observations in EB2). The 
effect of project centrality on development activity is significant at 1% confidence 
interval; and the effect of project centrality on popularity is significant at 5% 
confidence interval.  
The hypotheses test results from H1 and H2 suggest that the centrality of OSS project 
teams play an important role in the evolving success of the projects. Centralized 
projects are good for increasing development activity, but the cost is that these 
projects are susceptible to losing popularity among end users. The managers of the 
OSS projects need to target either on development activities or for popularity among 
end users. Balancing of communication centrality within OSS projects is of crucial 
importance for the success of these projects. 
Project Density and Success: H3 proposes that project density will negatively affect 
the level of project development activities. The model shows the negative and 
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significant effect of project density on development activity at 1% confidence interval 
( 3α =-2.176, S.E.=0.475). Thus, H3 is supported. H4 suggests that project density will 
positively affect the level of project popularity. The regression results shows the 
positive and significant effect of density on popularity at 1% confidence interval ( 3β
=1.824, S.E.=0.217). Thus, H4 is supported. 
The hypotheses test results from H3 and H4 enable us to draw a tentative conclusion 
that the effect of project density is significant to the project success which is measured 
by both the level of development activities and project popularity. A high density 
project is likely to be responsive to changes in developmental requirements, but the 
communication efficiency among developers is likely to be reduced. Therefore, to 
project managers, there also exist tradeoffs in communication density. Thus, balancing 
project centrality and density is an important task for project managers to enable OSS 
projects to achieve long-term success in the competitive environment.  
Leadership Centrality and Success: H5 proposes that project leadership centrality will 
positively affect the level of project development activities. H6 proposes that leader’s 
participations in other projects will yield a positive effect on project development 
activities for the projects with higher leadership centrality. The estimation results 
show some support for both H5 and H6. In the activity model, the effect of leadership 
centrality is positive and significant at 1% confidence interval ( 4α =1.402, S.E.=0.389); 
the effect of  interaction effect of leadership centrality and participation is also 
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positive and significant at 1% confidence interval ( 6α =0.199, S.E.=0.052). Thus, H5 
and H6 are supported. H7 proposes that project leadership centrality will negatively 
affect the level of project popularity. H8 proposes that leader’s participations in other 
projects will yield a negative effect on project popularity for the projects with higher 
leadership centrality. In the popularity model, we find a negative and significant 
coefficient of leadership centrality ( 4β =-0.845, S.E.=0.195); and also a negative and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term ( 6β =-0.101, S.E.=0.025). Thus, H7 and 
H8 are supported. 
The hypotheses test results from H5 to H8 suggest that leadership centrality is 
important for the OSS projects. Leaders in the project play a crucial role in improving 
the performance of the project teams. Leaders may take part in several projects 
simultaneously, which can help to improve the performance of the leader and enhance 
the reputation of the leader among the developers in different projects. However, 
heavily reliance on the single leader has the potential risks for the demand among end 
users.  
Project Specific Characteristics and Success: Hypothesis 9 (A, B) proposes the 
relationships between project-specific characteristics and project development 
activities. H9A proposes that a project with a restrictive license will be likely to 
achieve a higher level of development activities. The results from the model 
estimation show the positive and significant effect of type of licence on the 
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development activity at 1% confidence interval ( 8α =10.792, S.E.=1.871). H9B 
proposes that a more complex project will be likely to achieve a lower level of 
development activities. We find a negative and significant coefficient of project 
complexity at 1% confidence interval ( 7α =-0.166, S.E.=0.034). Therefore, H9A and 
H9B are supported.  
Hypothesis 10 (A, B, C) proposes the relationships between project-specific 
characteristics and project popularity. We find support for these hypotheses. H10A 
proposes that a project utilizing a popular programming language will be likely to 
achieve a higher level of development activities. The model shows a positive and 
significant coefficient of programming language at 1% confidence interval ( 8β =0.262, 
S.E.=0.064). H10B proposes that a project with a longer time history will be likely to 
achieve a higher level of popularity. The model also shows a positive and significant 
coefficient of project age at 1% confidence interval ( 7β =0.015, S.E.=0.001). H10C 
proposes that a project targeting at end users will be likely to achieve a higher level of 
popularity. We find the positive and significant effect of target audience on popularity 
at 1% confidence interval ( 9β =0.386, S.E.=0.095). Therefore, H10A, H10B and 





2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the long term effects of communication 
pattern on the success of open source projects. We base our research on the theoretical 
study of social network theory. Results, shown in Table 2.2, are generally supportive of 
the hypotheses posited in this paper. By observing changes in communication patterns 
for an extended period, we find significant impacts of communication patterns on the 
Table 2.7 Summary of Hypotheses Test 
H1: Project centrality will positively affect the level of project development 
activities. 
Not Supported
H2: Project centrality will negatively affect the level of project popularity. Supported 
H3: Project density will negatively affect the level of project development 
activities. 
Supported 
H4: Project density will positively affect the level of project popularity. Supported 
H5: Project leadership centrality will positively affect the level of project 
development activities. 
Supported 
H6: Leader’s heightened participations in other projects will yield a positive 
effect on the level of project development activities for projects with high 
leadership centrality. 
Supported 
H7: Project leadership centrality will negatively affect the level of project 
popularity. 
Supported 
H8: Leader’s heightened participations in other projects will yield a negative 
effect on the level of project popularity for projects with high leadership 
centrality. 
Supported 
H9A: A project with a restrictive license will be likely to achieve a higher level of 
development activities. 
Supported 
H9B: A more complex project will be likely to achieve a lower level of 
development activities. 
Supported 
H10A: A project utilizing a popular programming language will be likely to 
achieve a higher level of development activities. 
Supported 
H10B: A project with a longer time history will be likely to achieve a higher level 
of popularity. 
Supported 





outcome of the project.  
The findings of our research has implications for project managers and developers in 
open source environments, as well as for managers of commercial software firms, such 
as Microsoft and IBM, which are actively participating in open source projects. 
Furthermore, these findings and implications can also be generalized for virtual team 
communities. Open source software development is one of the prime manifestations of 
virtual teams collaborating over the Internet. Such virtual team creates value through 
developing and spreading new knowledge and capabilities, fostering innovations, and 
building and testing trust in working relations (Kidane and Gloor 2007), relying heavily 
on information and communication technologies to accomplish their tasks (Powell et al 
2004). For virtual teams to achieve their objectives and successfully complete their 
tasks, information must be effectively exchanged. Thus, communication and 
coordination have been found to be two major aspects that significantly affect the 
performance of virtual teams (Johansson et al. 1999; Maznevski and Chudoba 2001). 
Thus, the findings and implications from examining the coordination and 
communication characteristics (i.e., the social network attributes: project centrality, 
project density, and leadership centrality) are also helpful for virtual team leaders to 
monitor the performance of the teams.  
As one of the attributes of communication pattern, project centrality expresses the 
inequality or variance of contribution in communication among the contributors. The 
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effects of project centrality on project development activity and popularity are 
examined and uncovered by our research model. The significant effect indicates that 
substantial inequality of developers’ contributions to the projects is important for 
project success. In a centralized network, some core members contribute more to the 
project. Such core-periphery structures can potentially enhance the speed and 
flexibility with which information diffuses within a group (Cummings and Cross 2003). 
Thus, centralized projects will be with higher communication efficiency and thereby 
related to better performance. However, heavily reliance on a small group of core single 
developers threatens the success of the open source projects. This may largely deter end 
users who seek stable continuous support and maintenance from the project teams. 
Centralized projects are good for developers to increase development activity, but the 
cost is that these projects are susceptible to losing end users and popularity. The project 
managers need to clarify their objectives: for development activity or for popularity. 
Balancing the communication centrality is important for the success of the projects. 
Another attribute of communication pattern discussed in this paper is project density. 
Project density measures the readiness of the group to respond to changes, and how 
close a network is to realize its potential. In high-density projects, information 
dissemination is impeded, which negatively affects communication efficiency. 
However, this kind of structure allows for a speedy response to changes in the 
environment. Therefore, to project managers, there also exist tradeoffs of 
communication density. Thus, balancing project centrality and density is an important 
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task for project managers to ensure the success and survivability of OSS projects in a 
competitive environment. 
Leadership centrality measures the stature and influence of the project managers on 
the projects. A project manager plays the key role of coordinating overall project 
development activity. In a project with higher manager centrality, the manager has 
higher stature and more influence in the project team. The project manager serves as a 
conduit for information communication among the project team. In such high 
manager centrality projects, the managers can attract and communicate with many 
developers, and those developers may actively exchange information with their 
managers because of manager’s high stature and influence. However, heavy reliance 
on a single developer threatens the popularity the open source projects. There are the 
potential risks inside the project with high leadership centrality. There is the negative 
impact of leader’s simultaneous participations in other projects on popularity in high 
leadership centrality projects.  
In a nutshell, the project managers need to realize the importance of the 
communication pattern of project team. According to the objectives of projects, a 
proper and planned control for the communication among team members is crucial for 
the survivability of the open source projects.  
In general, executives at open source communities should note that communication 
pattern of the project team is critical to the long-term sustainability of OSS movement. 
75 
 
Since the view of project success from developers and general users are different, the 
success of projects could not be captured by the single aspect. Based on our results, 
the impact of communication patterns on demand side and supply side success are 
different. It implies that the project managers can reap the benefits if they structure 
their project teams with care. The managers need to consider and balance not only 
communication centrality but also communication density among developers. 
Since research on open systems environments is new, theoretical insights in this 
domain are just emerging (Hippel and Krogh 2003). From a theoretical standpoint, we 
apply social network theory into the information systems domain, in particular, into 
the study of success of OSS projects. Although previous works have been conducted 
on various IS phenomenon from a social network perspective, we are among the first 
to apply the social network theory with encouraging success to the OSS development 
realm. Our results suggest several directions for theory development on the effect of 
communication pattern of the project team on project success. First, it is important to 
recognize that the effect of communication pattern varies with the indicators of 
project success. Researchers in this domain could explore this difference more in 
depth. OSS development is different from the traditional software development. For 
the traditional software project, the eventual market share of the software product can 
indicate whether this project is a success or failure. However, for the OSS project, the 
success of the project needs to be viewed from both the developers and the end users’ 
aspects. Thus, OSS success has different dimensions. A single measurement or 
76 
 
operationalization will not be sufficient to completely represent success. Therefore, 
development activity and popularity are both more useful indicators of the OSS 
success. The effects of communication pattern on development activity and popularity 
are different in that the communication structure of OSS development is viewed 
differently by developers and end users. Second, it is important to recognize that 
success is transient. The evolutionary changes in the success and survivability of 
software projects are related to dynamic communication patterns among stakeholders 
in the course of software development processes. Examining the status of projects 
over an extended period is a more rigorous method to assess the long term evolving 
success of OSS projects. Our research takes some important steps in this direction and 
we hope that further investigations of long term success from social network 
perspective are explored in the future research. 
From a data manipulation standpoint, this work still has limitions which need to be 
further investigated. To strengthen the rigor of our work, we perform multiple 
robustness checks for simultaneity bias of popularity and development activity, 
endogeneity bias of network measures, and different measurements of popularity and 
development activity. However, the network measures are not something given from 
outside of the project. It is possible to still have the endogeneity problem. Therefore, 
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Project Centrality and Leadership Centrality: Centrality can be defined on an 
individual or overall level for a network. Degree centrality adopted in this chapter was 
defined by Freeman (1979). Degree centrality represents a position’s potential for 
activity in communication, and signifies a group member who is “in the thick of things”. 
Degree centrality refers to the number of other positions in the network in direct contact 









Where xn = number of other positions in direct contact with position x; N = number of 
positions in the network. In this study, leadership centrality refers to the degree 
centrality of the project manager if there is only one manager of the project; or refers 
to the average degree centrality of the project managers if there are more than one 
managers of the project.  
We also examine the network centrality. In this study, project centrality refers to the 
network centrality on the project level. Freeman expressed the degree of inequality or 
variance in the network as a percentage of that of a perfect star network of the same size. 















Where maxc = maximum degree in the network, ic = degree centrality of each 
individual, “current” represents the target network, and “star” represents the perfect 
star network of the same size as target network.  
All the individual’s centrality and network centrality can be calculated by social 
network analysis software: Ucinet. Table 2.8 shows examples of degree centrality and 
network centrality in the five-person networks. 
 
Social Network Graphs: To better understand the communication patterns, we give the 
communication graphs of an example open source project (project “YUI Library”) of 
each month in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8. To let the readers clearly know how the 
communication patterns change, we also provide the data of communication patterns 
of each month in Table 2.9.  
Table 2.8 Examples of Centrality 
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In the main contexts, we did not give the full table of the main results because of 
space limitation. In Table 2.10, we give the full results with the statistics of each 
project and month dummies (all the results are estimated by STATA).  
Table 2.10 Full Estimation Results 
 Obs R-sq Chi-sq p 
Log Activity 1004 0.312 2504.300  0.000 
Log Popularity 1004 0.968 141573.900  0.000 
Project Centrality 1004 0.145 523.240  0.000 
Project Density 1004 0.108 361.620  0.000 
Leadership Centrality 1004 0.345 1989.320  0.000 
Leadership Centrality * Participation 1004 0.590 3534.050  0.000 
 Coef. S.E. z p>|z| 
Log Activity     
Log Popularity 1.506 0.268 5.630  0.000 
Project Centrality 0.026 0.387 0.070  0.947 
Project Density -2.176 0.475 -4.580  0.000 
Leadership Centrality 1.403 0.389 3.600  0.000 
Participation 0.469 0.092 5.080  0.000 
Leadership Centrality * Participation 0.199 0.052 3.860  0.000 
Project Complexity -0.166 0.034 -4.900  0.000 
Licence (Restrictive) 10.792 1.871 5.770  0.000 
month7 0.028 0.036 0.790  0.432 
month8 -0.031 0.036 -0.840  0.398 
month9 0.058 0.036 1.600  0.110 
month10 0.043 0.035 1.220  0.223 
Table 2.9 Communication Pattern Data of Project “YUL_Library” 
 Project Centrality (%) Project Density (%) Leadership Centrality (%) 
Nov 2006 39.94 7.31 40.00
Dec 2006 33.66 6.97 26.83
Jan 2007 37.93 9.43 44.83
Feb 2007 32.54 5.22 36.54
Mar 2007 40.79 4.15 43.84
Apr 2007 59.59 6.46 51.90
May 2007 54.51 6.12 48.68
Jun 2007 54.87 5.52 49.32
Jul 2007 62.83 5.63 66.67
Aug 2007 73.60 3.39 75.68
Sep 2007 69.42 5.39 72.86
Oct 2007 68.79 4.87 71.64




month11 0.069 0.036 1.920  0.055 
month12 0.078 0.036 2.170  0.030 
month13 0.127 0.036 3.500  0.000 
project1 -1.630 0.530 -3.070  0.002 
project2 -10.502 1.960 -5.360  0.000 
project3 -4.286 0.794 -5.400  0.000 
project4 -4.393 0.954 -4.600  0.000 
project5 -4.047 1.027 -3.940  0.000 
project6 -9.876 1.899 -5.200  0.000 
project7 -9.264 1.719 -5.390  0.000 
project8 9.595 1.492 6.430  0.000 
project9 1.963 0.337 5.830  0.000 
project10 8.547 1.426 5.990  0.000 
project11 -2.582 0.626 -4.120  0.000 
project12 -7.337 1.263 -5.810  0.000 
project13 0.398 0.152 2.620  0.009 
project14 3.534 0.515 6.860  0.000 
project15 -3.884 0.790 -4.920  0.000 
project16 -0.695 0.321 -2.170  0.030 
project17 0.887 0.195 4.540  0.000 
project18 -4.318 0.796 -5.430  0.000 
project19 5.061 0.869 5.820  0.000 
project20 -5.742 1.184 -4.850  0.000 
project21 -0.004 0.201 -0.020  0.983 
project22 -7.724 1.492 -5.180  0.000 
project23 -6.591 1.149 -5.740  0.000 
project24 -1.573 0.309 -5.100  0.000 
project25 3.940 0.756 5.210  0.000 
project26 -3.020 0.498 -6.070  0.000 
project27 -7.539 1.355 -5.560  0.000 
project28 4.463 0.721 6.190  0.000 
project29 -0.973 0.319 -3.050  0.002 
project30 3.888 0.714 5.450  0.000 
project31 2.892 0.508 5.690  0.000 
project32 -0.756 0.206 -3.670  0.000 
project33 -6.238 1.120 -5.570  0.000 
project34 8.361 1.369 6.110  0.000 
project35 (dropped) 
project36 -3.051 0.542 -5.630  0.000 
project37 -4.488 0.835 -5.380  0.000 
project38 -8.332 1.574 -5.290  0.000 
project39 -7.291 1.488 -4.900  0.000 
project40 -3.760 0.853 -4.410  0.000 
project41 -2.668 0.702 -3.800  0.000 
project42 -7.385 1.401 -5.270  0.000 
project43 -6.780 1.278 -5.300  0.000 
project44 -6.744 1.233 -5.470  0.000 
project45 -8.362 1.455 -5.750  0.000 
project46 -5.167 0.943 -5.480  0.000 
project47 -0.400 0.208 -1.920  0.055 
project48 -5.888 1.155 -5.100  0.000 
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project49 4.180 0.755 5.540  0.000 
project50 7.202 1.242 5.800  0.000 
project51 -3.960 0.717 -5.520  0.000 
project52 9.419 1.332 7.070  0.000 
project53 -0.116 0.198 -0.590  0.557 
project54 -6.980 1.208 -5.780  0.000 
project55 -2.878 0.573 -5.020  0.000 
project56 7.707 1.287 5.990  0.000 
project57 -8.782 1.587 -5.530  0.000 
project58 -1.702 0.311 -5.480  0.000 
project59 -2.805 0.698 -4.020  0.000 
project60 -2.261 0.410 -5.520  0.000 
project61 -5.984 1.211 -4.940  0.000 
project62 -7.293 1.340 -5.440  0.000 
project63 -5.875 0.996 -5.900  0.000 
project64 3.442 0.650 5.290  0.000 
project65 -6.531 1.287 -5.070  0.000 
project66 -6.161 1.360 -4.530  0.000 
project67 -6.095 1.058 -5.760  0.000 
project68 -8.788 1.542 -5.700  0.000 
project69 3.761 0.616 6.110  0.000 
project70 -3.334 0.621 -5.370  0.000 
project71 -7.999 1.433 -5.580  0.000 
project72 -5.700 1.089 -5.240  0.000 
project73 -6.169 1.071 -5.760  0.000 
project74 -7.559 1.390 -5.440  0.000 
project75 -5.601 0.951 -5.890  0.000 
project76 -7.056 1.126 -6.270  0.000 
project77 -7.104 1.263 -5.620  0.000 
project78 -2.504 0.538 -4.650  0.000 
project79 10.329 1.716 6.020  0.000 
project80 -3.000 0.522 -5.750  0.000 
project81 -4.201 0.807 -5.210  0.000 
project82 -11.167 1.772 -6.300  0.000 
project83 -6.108 1.092 -5.590  0.000 
project84 -5.881 0.998 -5.900  0.000 
project85 -6.722 1.165 -5.770  0.000 
project86 -3.529 0.614 -5.750  0.000 
project87 -5.655 0.978 -5.780  0.000 
project88 3.612 0.507 7.130  0.000 
project89 -4.376 0.909 -4.820  0.000 
project90 -7.207 1.129 -6.380  0.000 
project91 -5.901 1.107 -5.330  0.000 
project92 (dropped) 
project93 6.009 1.004 5.990  0.000 
project94 -2.708 0.598 -4.530  0.000 
project95 1.843 0.321 5.750  0.000 
project96 6.105 1.086 5.620  0.000 
project97 1.626 0.284 5.720  0.000 
project98 6.309 1.090 5.790  0.000 
project99 -9.100 1.640 -5.550  0.000 
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project100 -10.311 2.073 -4.970  0.000 
project101 (dropped) 
project102 6.858 1.215 5.640  0.000 
project103 -9.090 1.730 -5.250  0.000 
project104 -9.265 1.745 -5.310  0.000 
project105 8.122 1.285 6.320  0.000 
project106 -1.537 0.369 -4.170  0.000 
project107 6.760 1.198 5.640  0.000 
project108 (dropped) 
project109 -6.378 1.364 -4.680  0.000 
project110 -8.121 1.680 -4.840  0.000 
project111 2.269 0.366 6.200  0.000 
project112 -7.943 1.506 -5.280  0.000 
project113 -8.434 1.503 -5.610  0.000 
project114 -3.359 0.625 -5.370  0.000 
project115 9.356 1.626 5.750  0.000 
project116 3.736 0.562 6.650  0.000 
project117 -4.709 0.834 -5.650  0.000 
project118 -2.086 0.403 -5.170  0.000 
project119 -4.841 1.076 -4.500  0.000 
project120 -5.816 1.160 -5.010  0.000 
project121 -4.425 0.848 -5.220  0.000 
project122 8.973 1.501 5.980  0.000 
project123 -7.397 1.228 -6.030  0.000 
project124 -1.594 0.361 -4.420  0.000 
project125 -6.360 1.147 -5.540  0.000 
project126 -9.987 1.661 -6.010  0.000 
constant -13.247 2.406 -5.500  0.000 
Log Popularity     
Log Activity 0.631 0.073 8.690  0.000 
Project Centrality -0.366 0.187 -1.950  0.051 
Project Density 1.824 0.217 8.420  0.000 
Leadership Centrality -0.845 0.195 -4.340  0.000 
Participation 0.009 0.013 0.710  0.479 
Leadership Centrality * Participation -0.101 0.025 -3.970  0.000 
Project Age 0.015 0.001 15.620  0.000 
Programming Language (C/C++) 0.262 0.064 4.100  0.000 
Target Audience (end user) 0.386 0.095 4.060  0.000 
month7 -0.034 0.018 -1.890  0.059 
month8 -0.011 0.017 -0.660  0.508 
month9 -0.083 0.019 -4.430  0.000 
month10 -0.088 0.018 -4.900  0.000 
month11 -0.122 0.019 -6.520  0.000 
month12 -0.138 0.020 -6.930  0.000 
month13 -0.190 0.020 -9.440  0.000 
project1 -0.520 0.090 -5.760  0.000 
project2 3.695 0.100 37.120  0.000 
project3 0.995 0.129 7.700  0.000 
project4 (dropped)   
project5 0.010 0.226 0.040  0.964 
project6 2.561 0.068 37.440  0.000 
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project7 2.322 0.071 32.630  0.000 
project8 -0.842 0.102 -8.260  0.000 
project9 3.648 0.092 39.610  0.000 
project10 0.000 0.122 0.000  0.997 
project11 -0.687 0.082 -8.390  0.000 
project12 1.208 0.104 11.630  0.000 
project13 -2.085 0.085 -24.430  0.000 
project14 -0.272 0.088 -3.090  0.002 
project15 -1.641 0.126 -12.990  0.000 
project16 -1.742 0.084 -20.700  0.000 
project17 3.234 0.096 33.860  0.000 
project18 -0.127 0.130 -0.980  0.326 
project19 0.877 0.115 7.620  0.000 
project20 1.348 0.171 7.900  0.000 
project21 -2.421 0.099 -24.500  0.000 
project22 1.739 0.103 16.820  0.000 
project23 0.435 0.142 3.060  0.002 
project24 -1.298 0.109 -11.870  0.000 
project25 1.016 0.122 8.340  0.000 
project26 -1.979 0.092 -21.510  0.000 
project27 2.108 0.104 20.260  0.000 
project28 1.206 0.109 11.110  0.000 
project29 -0.611 0.126 -4.860  0.000 
project30 1.200 0.105 11.390  0.000 
project31 2.060 0.087 23.690  0.000 
project32 -1.106 0.110 -10.010  0.000 
project33 1.093 0.141 7.750  0.000 
project34 (dropped) 
project35 (dropped) 
project36 -0.512 0.125 -4.110  0.000 
project37 0.503 0.105 4.790  0.000 
project38 2.692 0.074 36.200  0.000 
project39 1.851 0.078 23.820  0.000 
project40 -0.025 0.090 -0.270  0.786 
project41 -0.847 0.072 -11.800  0.000 
project42 1.521 0.083 18.360  0.000 
project43 2.044 0.107 19.190  0.000 
project44 1.969 0.092 21.410  0.000 
project45 2.096 0.088 23.870  0.000 
project46 0.421 0.084 4.980  0.000 
project47 -2.880 0.082 -35.010  0.000 
project48 0.320 0.081 3.930  0.000 
project49 1.660 0.132 12.620  0.000 
project50 -1.274 0.103 -12.420  0.000 
project51 -0.717 0.121 -5.940  0.000 
project52 -1.506 0.117 -12.840  0.000 
project53 -1.589 0.116 -13.660  0.000 
project54 1.505 0.097 15.460  0.000 
project55 -1.310 0.102 -12.830  0.000 
project56 -0.595 0.125 -4.750  0.000 
project57 1.342 0.083 16.270  0.000 
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project58 -2.057 0.134 -15.320  0.000 
project59 -1.299 0.131 -9.890  0.000 
project60 -0.967 0.117 -8.240  0.000 
project61 1.194 0.111 10.710  0.000 
project62 1.593 0.080 19.820  0.000 
project63 0.873 0.107 8.130  0.000 
project64 1.438 0.120 11.970  0.000 
project65 1.085 0.091 11.950  0.000 
project66 0.878 0.132 6.630  0.000 
project67 0.054 0.101 0.530  0.594 
project68 0.790 0.106 7.430  0.000 
project69 0.951 0.085 11.190  0.000 
project70 -1.285 0.088 -14.550  0.000 
project71 1.894 0.106 17.830  0.000 
project72 0.612 0.118 5.200  0.000 
project73 1.079 0.112 9.610  0.000 
project74 0.836 0.099 8.410  0.000 
project75 0.647 0.127 5.090  0.000 
project76 0.271 0.134 2.030  0.042 
project77 1.077 0.122 8.820  0.000 
project78 -0.778 0.102 -7.660  0.000 
project79 -2.575 0.074 -34.660  0.000 
project80 0.317 0.097 3.260  0.001 
project81 -0.236 0.121 -1.960  0.050 
project82 1.280 0.192 6.650  0.000 
project83 1.382 0.127 10.900  0.000 
project84 1.204 0.111 10.800  0.000 
project85 1.468 0.103 14.280  0.000 
project86 -1.089 0.125 -8.710  0.000 
project87 0.149 0.096 1.560  0.120 
project88 -2.009 0.115 -17.510  0.000 
project89 -0.374 0.175 -2.140  0.032 
project90 -0.749 0.133 -5.640  0.000 
project91 1.529 0.108 14.180  0.000 
project92 -2.958 0.086 -34.270  0.000 
project93 0.088 0.143 0.610  0.540 
project94 -0.923 0.107 -8.640  0.000 
project95 (dropped) 
project96 0.162 0.135 1.200  0.230 
project97 -3.007 0.131 -22.880  0.000 
project98 0.560 0.118 4.740  0.000 
project99 3.503 0.096 36.590  0.000 
project100 4.164 0.126 32.980  0.000 
project101 -0.485 0.092 -5.290  0.000 
project102 1.544 0.113 13.680  0.000 
project103 1.984 0.084 23.600  0.000 
project104 2.823 0.079 35.900  0.000 
project105 -0.156 0.080 -1.950  0.051 
project106 -2.330 0.091 -25.510  0.000 
project107 0.252 0.130 1.940  0.052 




project110 0.777 0.107 7.280  0.000 
project111 1.681 0.103 16.350  0.000 
project112 1.706 0.082 20.800  0.000 
project113 2.867 0.106 27.170  0.000 
project114 0.124 0.109 1.130  0.257 
project115 -1.916 0.102 -18.850  0.000 
project116 1.199 0.115 10.430  0.000 
project117 -0.710 0.118 -6.040  0.000 
project118 -0.836 0.119 -7.010  0.000 
project119 0.899 0.205 4.390  0.000 
project120 0.065 0.082 0.800  0.426 
project121 0.189 0.128 1.480  0.140 
project122 -2.248 0.087 -25.710  0.000 
project123 0.254 0.123 2.060  0.039 
project124 -0.558 0.093 -5.990  0.000 
project125 0.902 0.144 6.260  0.000 
project126 1.327 0.103 12.910  0.000 
constant 3.054 0.156 19.590  0.000 
Project Centrality     
Project Centrality (-1)  0.288 0.023 12.550  0.000 
Project Centrality (-2) 0.187 0.024 7.920  0.000 
Project Centrality (-3) 0.093 0.027 3.450  0.001 
Project Centrality (-4) 0.095 0.028 3.420  0.001 
Project Centrality (-5) 0.042 0.027 1.550  0.122 
constant 0.147 0.018 8.030  0.000 
Project Density     
Project Density (-1) 0.221 0.024 9.110  0.000 
Project Density (-2) 0.170 0.024 7.040  0.000 
Project Density (-3) 0.116 0.025 4.650  0.000 
Project Density (-4) 0.113 0.025 4.550  0.000 
Project Density (-5) 0.081 0.025 3.180  0.001 
constant 0.076 0.010 7.560  0.000 
Leadership Centrality     
Leadership Centrality (-1) 0.299 0.020 15.180  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-2) 0.226 0.020 11.080  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-3) 0.143 0.022 6.380  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-4) 0.117 0.023 5.160  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-5) 0.105 0.022 4.820  0.000 
constant 0.061 0.013 4.590  0.000 
Leadership*Participation     
Leadership Centrality (-1) * Participation 0.248 0.023 10.990  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-2) * Participation 0.227 0.024 9.580  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-3) * Participation 0.190 0.024 7.990  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-4) * Participation 0.243 0.023 10.410  0.000 
Leadership Centrality (-5) * Participation 0.051 0.024 2.150  0.031 





Chapter 3. Optimal Software Design and Pricing 
in the Presence of Open Source Software 
3.1 Introduction 
OSS refer to those programs “whose licenses give users the freedom to run the program 
for any purpose, to study and modify the program, and to redistribute copies of either 
the original or the modified program without having to pay royalties to previous 
developers” (Wheeler, 03). Since the first open source software was developed by 
Richard Stallman (GNU) in the 70’s, there have been a myriad of open source 
applications, ranging from common office suites such as StarOffice, to database 
(mySQL) and thousands of specialized scientific applications9. Open source software 
challenges the traditional idea that software must be licensed and cannot be modified 
according to individual needs. It makes source code publicly available for free usage 
                                                 




and modification, including bug fixing and customizing features. Ever since the 
burgeoning of open source software, it has attracted more and more attentions from 
individual users and organizations due to its “free of charge” and “freedom of 
distribution and modification.” A recent survey by Netcraft (www.netcraft.com) 
suggests that the market share of Apache grows rapidly and has exceeded Microsoft’s 
IIS.  
The growing popularity of open source software has stimulated wide-spread interest in 
academia. Numerous studies have been dedicated to decode the myth of open source 
participation and the relationship between open source and closed source software. 
Lerner and Tirole (2002) suggest that developers contribute to open source projects 
because of immediate and delayed economic benefits (signaling incentives) from open 
source development. Based on a case study of (LA)TEX, Gaudel (2003) concludes that 
open source inspired commercial software more than the reverse. On the other hand, the 
software industry, which traditionally operates on basis of software licensing, is more 
concerned with how to respond strategically to the open source phenomenon. Microsoft, 
the once strongest opponent to open source movement, has recently decided to include 
open source code in its shipping of Windows Server 2003 Cluster Edition (Galli 2005). 
Sun Microsystems is actively involved in the development of open source based Java 
projects in a hope to promote Java-related products. Without a doubt, the profitability 
of a commercial firm is affected (if not threatened) when the consumers are offered 
with an alternative free option other than its proprietary software. Commercial firms are 
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now confronted with the critical decision on how to optimally compete with open 
source software.  
The objective of this paper is to answer the key question about how a profit-seeking 
software firm should compete with open source software. Although competition has 
been the classic research topic in economic literature, the competition between open 
source and proprietary software has the following distinct features that deserve further 
analysis: (1) traditional duopoly competition model studies the equilibrium of two 
profit-making firms while open source software is free of charge and can’t be made for 
profit by itself; (2) traditional competition models normally study the optimal pricing 
while in case of software competition, the software producers has two arms to fight 
with competition – pricing and product design. For instance, if the commercial product 
is quite similar to open source products, the commercial firm faces fierce competition, 
but if the proprietary software is highly differentiated, the product might appeal to a 
small niche market only; (3) software products exhibit positive network externalities, 
which further complicates the decision of optimal price and product design.  
In this essay, we investigate two competition models: one-dimensional Hotelling model 
and two-dimensional vertical differentiation model. We first employ a stylized 
Hotelling model to study the optimal pricing and design of proprietary software in the 
presence of competitive open source software. We address the following research 
questions: (1) what is the impact of open source software’s positioning (design) on the 
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optimal price, design and profit of the proprietary software; (2) how is social welfare 
affected by the positioning of open source software; (3) what are the firm’s optimal 
strategy and profit when there’s positive network effect. Our analysis suggests that the 
profit of the commercial firm is dependent on fit cost and the positioning (design) of 
open source software. In particular, the commercial firm is best off when the open 
source software targets more specialized users. Furthermore, if the open source 
software targets the more specialized users, the commercial firm should serve only a 
proportion of the whole population. The market share of the commercial firm is largest 
when the open source software caters to users with extreme requirements, and a 
predatory pricing strategy is adopted by the commercial firm. In addition, we find that 
the social welfare is maximized when open source software targets more specialized 
users. Finally, a simple analysis of a special case suggests that the commercial firm 
gains more profit when there’s positive network externalities. However, since both 
open source and proprietary software benefit from network externalities, the 
commercial firm’s profit is not monotonically increasing or decreasing in network 
intensity.  
In the first model, we use one dimension to represent consumer taste. We did not give 
the details of the consumer taste. In the second model, we try to analyze the consumer 
taste in a specific way. Let’s consider two fundamental features of a software product: 
functionality and usability. Functionality refers to how many functions the software can 
provide; while usability represents how friendly the interface is. When choosing a 
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software product, average users first consider whether it contains the necessary 
functions and then they want to know whether it is easy to use. Generally speaking, 
software firms have to provide a friendly user interface in order to allow users to easily 
learn and use the software. At the same time, the firms must provide the basic as well as 
advanced functions to cater to the needs of different users. Because consumers have 
different needs and knowledge, there’s no single perfect design (usability and 
functionality) that fits everybody. In real business, commercial software companies 
(such as Microsoft) tend to target (naïve) customers with less computer skill and 
experience, while open source software (such as Linux) tends to target (sophisticated) 
customers with a certain level of computer and programming skill. In this model, we 
study the optimal design and pricing strategies for a monopoly commercial software 
firm to compete with open source software. The commercial software producer has to 
invest in a certain amount cost to achieve a certain level of usability and functionality 
for its product. We establish a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model to derive 
the optimal price and design of the commercial software product given the 
characteristics of the open source software. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The open source phenomenon has captured attention by academic scholars in various 
areas. One stream of literature deals with the motivation of participating in open source 
projects. Lerner and Tirole (2002) explain the immediate and delayed benefit from 
100 
 
engaging in open source development. They find that the developers improve 
programming ability and get recognition from peer developers. In the long run, they 
gain reputation and attain more desirable jobs. Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003) find 
similar results with that of Lerner and Tirole (2002). Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) 
divide programmers into different types: those who are devoted to bug fixing 
(sophisticated users), those who are devoted to software development (signaling 
incentives), and those who are employed by the commercial software companies. 
Lakhani and Wolf (2003) use a web-based survey and find that joy-based intrinsic 
motivations, namely how a person feels from a creative project, is the strongest and 
most pervasive driver. Roberts et al (2004) evaluate the theoretical model using survey 
from Apache web server projects. Their results reveal that the different types of 
motivations lead to different contributions to open source projects. The study of 
motivations of open source development helps to understand the distinctive 
characteristics of open source software. For example, it explains why open source 
software usually has an inferior graphical interface and documentation compared to its 
proprietary counterparts.  
A second stream of research compares the quality of open source and proprietary 
software, which has led to contradictory views. Kuan (2001) and Johnson (2004) 
believe that open source software provides higher quality than closed source software. 
At the same time, many industrial experts have raised concerns with the quality of open 
source software, criticizing its lack of customer support, security and reliability of open 
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source software (Shell 2005, Massel 2005). The different views imply that open source 
and proprietary software are adopted (preferred) by different groups of users. Bessen 
(2005) finds that the firms with strong software development capability or complex, 
specialized needs will most likely use open source software. Similarly, Gaudeul (2003) 
points out that because of lack of interface, open source software is left with users who 
cannot afford proprietary software (students), those who need its advanced capabilities 
(academics) and those who valued the flexibility to customize its own product 
(sophisticated users).  
Our research is mostly related to a third stream of research that focuses on the 
competition between open source and commercial software. Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat (2003) examine the dynamic competition between commercial software and 
open source by analyzing the demand-side learning effect. They conclude that in 
equilibrium the open source software will either coexist with commercial software or 
be driven out of the market. Gaudeul (2004) explores the market equilibrium by 
considering the interaction between software users and developers. It is assumed that 
users have different valuations of software features and developers have heterogeneous 
programming costs. Gaudeul (2004) concludes that in equilibrium, open source 
software is either driven out of market by proprietary software or coexists with 
proprietary software. If open source software does survive, it is used either by users 
who like more advanced features and do not care about awkward user interfaces or 
those low-income consumers who cannot afford to buy the proprietary software. Our 
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research differs from the work by Gaudeul (2004) in that we use horizontal 
differentiation model instead of the vertical differentiation adopted by Gaudeul (2004). 
In general, open source or proprietary software is preferred by different types of users: 
expert users like open source software because of its more advanced features and the 
flexibility to modify source code; while ordinary users prefer proprietary software since 
it offers better interface and more reliable customer support (Nichols & Twidale, 2003). 
In addition, we study the impact of open source software’s positioning on the optimal 
design and pricing of proprietary software, while Gaudeul (2004) concentrates on 
characterizing the equilibrium market share of open source and proprietary software. 
3.3 Model 1 
Consider two differentiated but competitive software products in market. One is offered 
by a commercial firm at price P  and the other is free as open source software (OSS). 
Although in many cases, a commercial firm can make profit by selling complementary 
applications or services to open source software, we focus on competition between a 
free open source and commercial software to study the optimal strategies of a 
commercial software firm in the presence of not-for-profit open source software. 
Software users, which differ in computing skills and knowledge, have different tastes of 
software products. Consumer tastes can be manifested in multiple ways. For example, 
expert users are more interested in advanced functions and the flexibility to customize 
source code while ordinary users are more interested in better interface for the ease of 
103 
 
use. We model consumer’s taste as her preference between open source and proprietary 
software. We adopt a Hotelling model to represent consumer taste, denoted by x , 
which is distributed uniformly in the interval between 0 and 1. The proprietary software 
and open source software are situated at points a  and 1 b− , respectively (see Figure 
3.1). Without loss of generality, we assume that (1 ) 1/ 2b− > . The opposite scenario 
can be studied by simply reversing the analysis in this paper. 
 
We assume that the location of OSS (1 b− ) is exogenously given. This is due to the 
idiosyncratic development process of open source projects. Open source software is 
developed by voluntary programmers. A new version of OSS is released whenever 
there’s sufficient contribution by the development community. Unlike commercial 
firms which can set a long-term development objective, open source projects are less 
coordinated and organized. As a result, the design of open software is more random in 
nature compared to proprietary software. Therefore, we first explore commercial firm’s 
optimal design and pricing strategies when the location (design) of OSS is given. Later, 
we compare the firm’s profit and social welfare with respect to different settings of 
OSS location. In a one-shot model, we assume the location of the OSS remain fixed 
 
Figure 3.1 The Hotelling Model 
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during the period of study. In addition, we assume consumers have perfect information 
about the location (design) of OSS and proprietary software. With the pervasive usage 
of Internet, users nowadays can easily find out information about a software product at 
low cost, such as via online forums and professional reviews. 
Consumer’s position on the Hotelling line represents her ideal location of software 
product. Each consumer incurs a fit cost that is proportional to the distance between her 
ideal product location and the location of proprietary or open source software. Let t  be 
the unit fit cost and v  be consumer’s reservation price for each type of software. Then 
the net utility for a consumer located at point x  from using open source ( osU ) and 





U x v t b x
U x v t x a P
= − − −
= − − −                                  (1) 
Consumers choose OSS or proprietary software by comparing her net utility from each 
type of software. The marginal consumer, denoted by x , is indifferent between open 
source and proprietary software. Since the consumers are uniformly distributed on the 
Hotelling line and the OSS is located at the right half of the line, the proprietary 
software must be located to the left of the OSS. Otherwise, the commercial firm will 
suffer from a smaller market share with the same price. As a result, the marginal 
consumer must be situated between the proprietary and OSS, see Figure 3.1. 
Specifically, the marginal consumer is described in Eq. (2). 
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( ) (1 )v t x a P v t b x− − − = − − −                           (2) 
The commercial firm should optimally set the price and location of its proprietary 
software to maximize its profit. In order to focus on the competition between OSS and 
proprietary software, we don’t consider the case when the marginal consumer receives 
negative utility. In other words, we assume that no consumer between a  and 1 is 
“stranded” by both types of software. Therefore, the commercial firm has two options – 
cover the entire market demand together with OSS; or cover a proportion of market 
demand together with OSS. In the following subsections, we analyze commercial 
firm’s optimal profit for each option. The optimal strategy is found by selecting the 
strategy that maximizes the firm’s profit. Due to limitation of space, we don’t provide 
detailed derivations. All proofs are available upon request.  
3.3.1 Market is fully covered 
When the market is fully covered, all consumers derive non-negative utilities from 
either type of software. It is required that the net utilities for consumers with largest fit 
cost, i.e., the consumer who are situated at point 0 and the marginal consumer situated 
at point x , are non-negative. When the market is fully covered, all consumers to the 
left of the marginal consumer will purchase the proprietary software and consumers to 
the right of the marginal consumer will use OSS. The market share for the commercial 
firm is x , which is described in Eq. (2). In sum, the profit maximization problem for 
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the commercial firm is formulated as Eq. (3) below. We solve for the constrained 
optimization problem by using Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The optimal price, location 
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3.3.2 Market is not fully covered 
When the market is not fully covered, some consumers located in the far left section of 
the Hotelling line derive negative utility from both OSS and proprietary software and 
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are thus left out of market. In such case, the furthest consumer who can be served by the 
proprietary software is the consumer who derives zero utility. The left most customer 
who will buy proprietary software (x0) is defined by Eq. (4) 
0 0( ) ( ) 0csU x v t a x P= − − − =                                (4) 
In correspondence, the demand (market share) of the proprietary software is 0x x− . 
We formulate the profit maximization decision of the commercial firm in Eq. (5). The 
constrained optimization problem can be solved by using Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The 
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Lemma 2.  If 2 (1 ) 1v b
t
< − < , the market is not fully covered by OSS and proprietary 
software. The optimal price is *3 2
v











π = . 
3.3.3 Analysis of results 
The optimal strategies prescribed by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are dependent on the ratio 
of product valuation and fit cost ( /v t ) as well as the location of the OSS (1 b− ). For 
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example, when / 1/ 2v t > , the condition in Lemma 2 is never satisfied since 1 1b− < . 
Proposition 1 summarizes the optimal strategies of the commercial firm under different 
conditions. Proposition 2 shows the optimal strategies with respect to different design 
of the open source software.  
Proposition 1. The optimal price, location and profit of the commercial firm given fit 




ia  and 
*
iπ  (i=1, 2, 3) are defined in Lemma 1 and 2.  
(1) If 0 / 3/10v t< < , the optimal strategy is to cover entire market by setting the 
price at *2P  and locate at 
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(2) If 3/10 / 1/ 2v t≤ < , the optimal strategy is to cover entire market by setting the 
price at *1P  and located at 
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(3) If 1/ 2 / 3/5v t≤ < , the optimal strategy is to cover entire market by setting the 
price at *1P  and located at 
*
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(4) If / 3/5v t ≥ , the optimal strategy is to cover the entire market by setting the 
price at *1P  and located at 
*
1a .  
Proposition 2. The commercial firm’s profit is at maximum when OSS targets more 
specialized users ( 2 / 1 1v t b< − < ), i.e. * * *3 2 1π π π> > . In addition, the commercial firm’s 
market share is maximized when 2 / 1 1v t b< − < , i.e., * * *3 0 2 1x x x x− > > . The price of the 
proprietary software is lower when the market is not fully covered, i.e., 
* * * *
1 3 2 3,P P P P> > . 
Next we examine the impact of OSS positioning of on social welfare. Since the price 
transferred from consumers to the commercial firms cancel out when we calculate 
social welfare, we only need to examine the total fit cost and gross utility by the 
consumers. The total fit cost (TF ) is defined in Eq (6), where the lower bound of 
integration of the first term (L) is 0 if market is fully covered and 0x  if market is not 
fully covered. Total social welfare is calculated as (1 )v L TF− − .  
1 1
1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( (1 ))
a x b
L a x b
TF t a x dx t x a dx t b x dx t x b dx
−
−
= − + − + − − + − −∫ ∫ ∫ ∫      (6) 
Proposition 3. The social welfare is maximized when OSS targets more specialized 
users. Specifically, social welfare is at maximum when (1 ) 2 /b v t− = .  
Proposition 1 suggests that the commercial firm is best off when the OSS caters to users 
with extreme requirements. In addition, we find that commercial firm does not need to 
serve the entire market if the OSS is situated at extreme locations. Interestingly, 
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although the commercial firm only targets partial consumers, its market share is still 
larger than the case when the market is fully covered. When the market is not fully 
covered, the commercial firm will set a low predatory price to command a large market 
share and subsequently gain greater profit. Proposition 2 suggests that the profit 
maximization objective by the commercial firm is also aligned with the objective of a 
social planner. Currently, most open source products are adopted by the niche market of 
low-income or high-skill users. Advocators of open source software often argue that the 
open source community has been improving the interface and documentation to make it 
more like their user-friendly proprietary counterparts. However, our analysis suggests 
that the social welfare might decrease with improved usability of open source products, 
as it reduces the differentiation between OSS and proprietary software. At the same 
time, commercial firm suffers from profit loss by the presence of a “closer-look” open 
source product.     
3.3.4 The impact of network effect 
In this section, we examine the impact of network effect on commercial firm’s optimal 
strategy and profit. The competition between OSS and proprietary software becomes 
rather complicated in the presence of positive network externalities. For example, the 
marginal consumer is found between OSS and proprietary software without network 
effect. However, in the presence of positive network effect, the marginal consumer 
could be situated to the left of the proprietary software if the intensity of network 
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externalities for OSS is sufficiently large. It’s beyond the space limit to examine all 
possible scenarios. Rather, we present the simplest case. That is, we assume that the 
network intensity is same for both OSS and proprietary software. Further, we study the 
special case where the fit cost is low ( t v< ) and the OSS is situated at the extreme 
location ( 0b = ). Notice that optimal strategy without network effect when t v<  is 
specified by case (4) in Proposition 1, i.e., the market is fully covered. In comparison, 
we analyze the commercial firm’s profit in the presence of network externalities by 
considering the case when the market is fully covered.  
Let γ  be the intensity of network effect for both OSS and proprietary software. 
Further, it is assumed that there’s no cross-product externality between OSS and 
proprietary software. This is because open source and proprietary software are 
normally adopted by separate consumer camps with different tastes. When there’s 
positive network externality, each consumer enjoys an increase of utility, characterized 
by iQγ , where iQ  ( ,i c o= ) is the total installed base of the software adopted by the 
particular consumer. The net utilities from open source ( 'osU ) and closed source (
'
csU ) 
software with network externality for a consumer of type x  is defined by Eq. (7).  
'
'
( ) (1 )
( ) ( )
os o
cs c
U x v t x Q
U x v t x a p Q
γ
γ
= − − +
= − − − +                         (7) 
Let 'x  be the marginal consumer indifferent between OSS and proprietary software. If 
the market is fully covered, the size of the installed base for OSS is '1oQ x= −  and the 
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size of the installed base for proprietary software is 'cQ x= . We assume that tγ < , 
which is required by the decrease of demand in price. The profit maximization problem 
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Conditions (8a) and (8b) specify that the marginal consumer is situated between 
proprietary (located at a) and open source software (located at 1). Conditions (8c) and 
(8d) are required to ensure that market is fully covered, i.e., the net utilities for 
consumer at location 0 and 'x  are non-negative. We apply Kuhn-Tucker conditions to 
solve the above constrained optimization problem. The solution is presented in 
Proposition 4. The impact of network externality is summarized in Proposition 5.  
Proposition 4. In the presence of network externality, the optimal price, location and 
profit of the proprietary software when t v< , 0b = are specified as follows. 


































−= − . 
Proposition 5. In the presence of network externality, the price of commercial software 
decreases, the market share of the proprietary software increases, and the commercial 
firm’s profit increases. However, the commercial firm’s profit is not monotonically 
increasing or decreasing in network externality intensity. Specifically, * '* '*1 1 2P P P> > , 
* '* ' *
1 1 2Q Q Q< <  and '* ' * *1 2 1π π π> > .  
In summary, we find the commercial firm benefits from positive network externality. 
More interestingly, we find that the commercial firm’s profit is not strictly increasing or 
decreasing with network intensity. This is because both open source and proprietary 
users benefit from the positive network effect. In other words, larger network intensity 
renders both types of software more attractive to users.  
3.4 Model 2 
In the first model, we use one dimension to represent consumer taste. We did not give 
the details of the consumer taste. In this model, we try to analyze the consumer taste in 
a specific way. Let’s consider two fundamental features of a software product: 
functionality and usability. Functionality refers to how many functions the software can 
provide; while usability represents how friendly the interface is. When choosing a 
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software product, average users first consider whether it contains the necessary 
functions and then they want to know whether it is easy to use. Generally speaking, 
software firms have to provide a friendly user interface in order to allow users to easily 
learn and use the software. At the same time, the firms must provide the basic as well as 
advanced functions to cater to the needs of different users. Because consumers have 
different needs and knowledge, there’s no single perfect design (usability and 
functionality) that fits everybody. In real business, commercial software companies 
(such as Microsoft) tend to target (naïve) customers with less computer skill and 
experience, while open source software (such as Linux) tends to target (sophisticated) 
customers with a certain level of computer and programming skill. In this model, we 
study the optimal design and pricing strategies for a monopoly commercial software 
firm to compete with open source software. The commercial software producer has to 
invest in a certain amount cost to achieve a certain level of usability and functionality 
for its product. We establish a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model to derive 
the optimal price and design of the commercial software product given the 
characteristics of the open source software. 
3.4.1 Model Setting 
We employ a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model to analyze the optimal 
strategies (price and product design) of a commercial software firm in the presence of 
the competing open source software. We focus on two basic characteristics of an 
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application: how friendly the interface is (usability) and how many functions the 
application provides (functionality). Due to different knowledge and experience with 
IT products, the consumers’ taste (valuation) for usability and functionality are 
heterogeneous. We model the consumer’s valuation of usability and functionality in an 
orthogonal coordinate, with each coordinate uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1). 
Specifically, the horizontal dimension (x-axis) represents the distribution of consumer’s 
valuation of usability, denoted by 1θ ; and the vertical dimension (y-axis) represents the 
distribution of consumer’s valuation of functionality, denoted by 2θ . In short, the 
consumer type is described by the pair ( 1θ , 2θ ). 
Each product (open source and proprietary software) is characterized by its usability 
and functionality, denoted by the pair ( , )x y . We assume that there’s no correlation 
between usability and functionality. In accordance with the consumer distribution, the 
product space is set in an orthogonal coordinate, with x-axis representing usability and 
y-axis representing functionality. The consumers with at most one unit demand can 
choose between a proprietary software and an open source software, which are located 
at point ( , )ps psx y  and ( , )os osx y , respectively (see Figure 3.2). We assume that the 
consumers’ reservation prices are high enough such that they either choose the open 
source software or buy the commercial software. Let P  be the price charged by the 
commercial firm. The consumer’s net utility from the commercial software ( psU ) and 












= +                              (9)   
where ( , )ps psx y  and ( , )os osx y  are the locations (characteristics) of commercial and 
open source software and ( 1θ , 2θ ) denotes the consumer type.   
 
Previous studies (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003; Schmidt and 
Schnitzer, 2002) of the motivation of open source projects suggests that developers like 
to work on open source projects which are interesting and challenging. From the 
computer experts’ perspective, adding features is usually deemed as more interesting 
and challenging than user interface improvement since it is a better way to show off 
their talent. Therefore, developers of open source software are more interested in 
improving functionality than usability (Nichols and Twidale, 2003). On the other hand, 
commercial software firms (such as Microsoft) tend to target ordinary (naïve) 
customers who have less computer knowledge and skill. Therefore, commercial firms 
 




have to provide a friendlier user interface in order to let users easily understand and use 
their software. To reflect business reality, we assume that open source software has a 
relative advantage on functionality, while proprietary software has a relative advantage 
on usability. That is, ps osx x> and os psy y> . We don’t consider the cases where either 
ps osx x=  or ps osy y= , which reduce the problem to one dimension differentiation, 
which has been studied in the first model.  
The characteristics (usability and functionality) of the open source software are 
assumed to be exogenous. This assumption is based on the nature of the open source 
and commercial software. First, since the developers voluntarily join open source 
projects, the developer camp is more fluid in an open source environment and the 
projects are less organized (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Thus the open source projects 
usually do not have as clear direction as its commercial counterpart. Second, the quality 
(usability or functionality) of open source software is constricted by the capability and 
devotion of “freelance” developers, resulting in more uncertainty in usability and 
functionality. Third, the launch of a new version of commercial software usually 
involves costly and time-consuming preparation, such as market analysis and forecast, 
product design and price setting. In contrast, open source projects are not profit-driven 
and enjoy the flexibility of releasing new versions whenever there’s sufficient 




To solve the two-dimensional vertical differentiation model, we need to examine the 
product space and the consumer space to determine demand for the commercial product 
(see Figure 3.3). As explained before, the open source software has an advantage over 
functionality and commercial software has an advantage over usability, i.e., ps osx x>  
and os psy y> . Let β  be the slope of the line perpendicular to the line connecting two 





β −= −  (see Figure 3.3). That is, β  represents the relative 
positioning of two products.  
 
Consumers choose either open source software or proprietary software in order to 
maximize their utility as defined by Eq. (9). The marginal consumers who are 




os ps os ps
x x P
y y y y
θ θ−= −− −                           (10) 
     
Figure 3.3 Product Space (left) and Consumer Space (right) 
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Note that the slope of the indifference curve is tgβ  defined in the product space. The 
indifference curve divides the consumer population into two parts: consumers above 
the indifference line choose open source software and consumers below the 
indifference line choose proprietary software. In other words, the demand of 
commercial software is determined by the area below the indifference line in the 
consumer space (unit square), denoted by psD . 
The commercial software firm has to incur a cost to deliver a certain level of quality 
(usability and functionality). We assume the development cost is quadratic in software 
quality. Put in math, the total cost to reach the product location ( , )ps psx y  is 
2 2
1 2ps psc x c y+ , where 1c  is the cost parameter of designing user interface and 2c  is the 
cost parameter of developing functions. In summary, the profit function of a proprietary 
software firm is defined as:  
2 2
1 2( )ps ps ps psD P c x c yπ = ⋅ − +                        (11) 
Due to the long development cycle and high uncertainties associated with software 
development, firms usually develop the software before setting the price. Therefore, we 
use backward induction to find the sub-game perfect equilibrium. That is, we first 
derive the optimal price given the location (design) of the product and then solve for the 
optimal location of the commercial software.  
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3.4.2 Optimal Pricing of Commercial Software 
Due to different expressions of the demand function ( psD ), we need to study the firm’s 
optimal pricing strategy in the following two cases: 45β > D  and 45β ≤ D .  
3.4.2.1 Case 1. 45β > D  
In this case, the difference in usability is greater than that of functionality, i.e., 
ps os os psx x y y− > −  (see Figure 3.4). We define 0P  as the price when the indifference 
curve passes through point (0, 0) and hP  is the price when the indifference curve 
passes through point (1, 0). By definition, 0 0P =  and h ps osP x x= − . Note that hP  is 
the highest price the commercial firm can charge. If the price is larger than hP , all the  
consumers will choose open source software. Let kP  be the price when the 
indifference curve passes through point (1,0), i.e., ( ) ( )k ps os os psP x x y y= − − − . If the 
indifference curve falls between the line defined by 0P  and kP , the demand of the 
commercial software has the shape of a trapezoid. If the indifference curve falls 
between the line defined by kP  and hP , the demand of the commercial software has 




Scenario 1  
When the price of the commercial software is between 0P  and kP , the demand for the 
proprietary software is the sum of area of a triangle and a parallelogram (see Figure 3.4 





ps os ps os
y y PD
x x x x
−= − −− −                        (12) 
The profit maximization of the commercial firm is defined as:  
2 2
1 2
1 (1 ) ( )
2
     . .  0
os ps
ps ps ps
ps os ps os
k
P
y y P P c x c y
x x x x
s t P P
Max π
−= − − ⋅ − +− −
≤ <
      (13) 
We derive the optimal price for the commercial software as required by first order 
condition, described in Eq. (14):  
         
(a) when price is between 0P and kP     (b) when price is between kP and hP  
Figure 3.4 Demand of Commercial Product ( 45α > D ) 
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* 2( ) ( )
4
ps os os psx x y yP
− − −=                          (14) 






− <− .  
Scenario 2  
When price is in the interval [ , ]k hP P , the demand for proprietary software is the area 
of a triangle as follows:  
2( )1
2 ( )( )
ps os
ps
ps os os ps
x x P
D
x x y y
− −= − −                          (15) 
We solve for the profit maximization problem for the commercial firm to get the 




−=                                (16) 







−≤ <− .  
3.4.2.2 Case 2. 45β ≤ D   
In this case, the difference in functionality is greater than that of usability, i.e., 
ps os os psx x y y− ≤ −  (see Figure 3.5). h os psP x x= −  is still the highest price that 
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commercial software firm can set. Since 0kP <  in this case, the equilibrium price of 
the commercial software must be set in the interval (0, )hP . Therefore, the demand for 
the commercial software is the area of shaded triangle (see Figure 3.5). The demand is 
defined as:  
 
2( )1
2 ( )( )
ps os
ps
ps os os ps
x x P
D
x x y y
− −= − −                          (17) 
We solve for the profit maximization problem for the commercial firm to get the 




−=                                (18) 
Note that the optimal price ( *P ) is in the interval (0, )hP  under the condition 
 








− ≥− .  
The optimal price, demand and profit of commercial software firm under the different 
conditions are summarized in Table 3.1. Note that the conditions are determined by the 
relative positioning of the two products (open source and proprietary software), or 
tgβ defined in the product space. 
3.4.3 Optimal Design of Commercial Software 
Since the price equilibria are determined by the product positions, we can directly 
incorporate the price equilibria into product positions analysis. To find the optimal 
positions, we solve these constrained optimization problems by using Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions (see proof in Appendix). As a result, there are two possible solutions under 
the certain conditions: one is interior; the other is on the boundary.  
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+− > . It is too complex to express the solution in the specific equations. 
But we can confirm that if it is valid10, the optimal usability ( *1x ) and functionality (
*
1y ) 
of commercial software are on the curve (shown in Figure 3.6):  
2
1 24 32 (2 16 )ps psx c y c− = −        

















                                                 
10 There is the positive profit for the commercial firm. 
 






− <−  
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and 2 1 2
1 2




c x c yx y
c c
− + −+ < . 
It implies that only when usability and functionality of open source software satisfy the 
condition above (see Figure 3.7), the boundary solution exists. Table 3.2 shows the 
optimal solutions (price and product design) of the commercial software firm.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Boundary Solution of the Software Firm 
Profit 
2 2
* 2 1 2 2 2
1 2
1 24 36 ( 4 12 9 )
36(9 4 )
os os os os os osc y c x c x c x y c y
c c
π + − + + += +  
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− <− , the interior solution achieves and the market share of commercial 






− =− , boundary solution reaches and the 






− >− , the market 
share of commercial software is less than one third and there no valid optimal product 
design because of negative profit. It implies that if the open source has sufficient better 
advantage in functionality relative to its disadvantage in user interface, it will attract 
most customers in the market (2/3 of the market) and commercial software will be 
washed out of the market since commercial firm cannot make profit.  
Proposition 5. If the open source has sufficient better advantage in functionality 
relative to its disadvantage in user interface, the proprietary software will be driven out 
of the market. 
The open source has sufficient better advantage over functionality relative to its 






− >−  in Table 3.1. When 
commercial software firm implements optimal strategy in this case, the firm could not 
make positive profit (detail proof in Appendix). We also find that in this case the 














− <− ) the market share is equal or larger than one third. In the 
other words, if market share of commercial software is very low, the commercial firm 
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will give up this market. 
3.4.4 Comparative Static Analysis 
We summarize the comparative statistics in Table 3.3.  
3.4.4.1 Relationship between product design and development cost  
(Boundary Solution) For a commercial software firm, higher cost in designing usability 
will induce lower usability; higher cost in designing functionality will result in lower 
functionality. It is reasonable that high cost induces low “quality”. However, higher 
cost in designing usability will encourage better functionality and higher cost in 
designing functionality may also encourage better usability. It implies that if the cost on 
one character is very high, the effort on the other character will increase, that is, the 
“quality” of the other character increases. 
(Interior Solution) For the proprietary software, higher cost in designing functions or 
usability will induce both lower usability and lower functionality, i.e., high cost induces 





3.4.4.2 Relationship between product design and open source position  
(Boundary Solution) The more usability and functions provided by open source 
software, the more usability and functions commercial software needs to design. In the 
other words, when two products compete with each other, if one product provides better 
“quality”, the other should provide better “quality” too. Since in this case, market share 
of commercial software is one third. In order to maintain this demand, if open source 
Table 3.3 Comparative Statistics of Optimal Solutions 
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provides better product, commercial should also provides better product to attract 
customers.  
(Interior Solution) Opposite to boundary solution, if open source is with higher 
usability or functionality, commercial software will provide lower usability or 
functionality instead. 
3.4.4.3 Relationship between price and open source position 
(Boundary Solution) After designing the product, commercial software firm need to set 
its price. If open source software provides better interface, the price of commercial 
software should be lower; if open source software provides more functions, the price 
should be higher. Since proprietary software has the relative advantage in usability, if 
open source is with better usability, this advantage will be weakened. In order to 
compete with open source, lowering price is a reasonable way to catch the users. On the 
other side, open source has the relative dominance in functionality. Since open source 
has owned high functionality but low usability, improving functions will push some 
average users to proprietary software. At this time, increasing price can bring 
commercial software more profit. There are still some naive users who will buy 
commercial software with higher price because they have not enough ability to use 
open source software which is with not friendly user interface.  
(Interior Solution) If open source provides better interface or better functionality, 
131 
 
commercial software firm should set higher price to compete with open source. This 
strategy is to give up some users but to earn more from the naive users. Although the 
demand is lower, but commercial firm still make profit.  
3.4.4.4 Relationship between profit and open source position 
(Boundary Solution) Profit is the most concern for the commercial software. Whatever 
the product designing and price setting, all are for maximizing profit. The level of 
usability and functionality of open source software does affect the profit of commercial 
firm. From our analysis, if open source provides higher usability, the profit of 
commercial firm will be lower; if open source provides higher functionality, the profit 
has both possibilities of higher or lower which depends on characteristics of open 
source product (see Figure 3.8). Through this result, it is obvious that better usability of 
open source software brings a bigger threat to commercial software. It just identifies 
that the great fear of commercial software firms is that somebody will come behind 
them and make products that not only are more functions but are also easy to use, fun, 
and make people more productive. In fact, however, open source developers do not 
have more intention to improve the usability. Therefore, as mentioned by Lerner and 
Tirole (2002), open source project requires a credible leader who must provide a 
‘vision’. 
(Interior Solution) In this case, if open source provides better usability or better 
functionality, the profit of commercial firm will be lower. That is, the better “quality” of 
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open source software, the less profit a commercial firm can earn.  
 
3.4.5 Welfare Analysis 
Since the specific product characteristics are difficult to drive when there are interior 
solutions for the software firm, welfare analysis only focuses on that of boundary 
solutions. We investigate the welfare properties of this equilibrium. When commercial 
firm obtains optimal profit, the welfare that all users get (consumer surplus) are 
captured as (proved in Appendix): 
1 2 1 2
1 2
2 207 108 243 132
486 216
os os os osc x c x c y c yCS
c c
+ + + += +  
From the above equation, better usability or functionality of open source software will 
bring more consumer surplus. Since open source is free of usage, if it can provide better 
product and attract more people to use it, consumer surplus would increase. It implies 
 




that consumers are always better off when the open source software provides better 
usability or functionality. 
3.4.6 Overall Analysis 
(Boundary Solution) The appearance of open source does affect the commercial 
software firm. In the equilibrium, the price, profit and product characteristics of 
commercial software firm are determined by the costs of designing product and the 
characteristics of open source software. If open source provides better user interface, 
commercial software firm needs to provide better usability and functionality with lower 
price to maintain the demand. As a result, the profit is cut down. If open source 
provides better functionality, commercial software firm needs to provide better 
usability and functionality with higher price. Then, the profit will be either higher or 
lower which is dependent on the current characteristics of open source software. 
Furthermore, better usability or functionality by open source will bring higher surplus 
for consumers. It is a good situation for users that open source provides better usability 
and functionality. 
(Interior Solution) For open source software, the advantage over functionality relative 
to its disadvantage in user interface is not obvious in this case. When open source 
provides higher usability or functionality, the advantage of open source is more obvious. 
In order to make profit, commercial firm have to provide less usability (but still higher 
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than open source usability) and functionality with higher price. Through giving up 
some consumers but increasing price, commercial firm still can make profit. When 
open source is strong enough, commercial firm could not compete with it using this 
interior strategy, and should change to boundary strategy.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Open source software has been gaining popularity among individuals and organizations 
as a ”free ” alternative to traditional proprietary software. No doubt, the commrecial 
firm’s profit is affected by the presence of open source software. Past study on the 
comparison between open source and proprietary software suggests that open source 
software offers better functionality while proprietary software has advantage in ease of 
use and reliable customer support. Consequently, open source and proprietary software 
are normally preferred by different groups of consumers with distinct requirement 
(tastes). In the first model, we employ a Hotelling model to study the optimal strategies 
of commercial firms when consumers have different tastes. In particular, we seek to 
solve for the optimal design and pricing of proprietary software. Further, we analyze 
the impact of network externaltiy on the optimal strategy and profit of the commercial 
firm. In the second model, extent the tastes of consumers to two dimentions: usability 
and functionality. We employ a two-dimensional vertical differentiation model in 
which consumers choose open source or commercial software on base of usability and 
functionality of the product. Given the characteristics of the open source software, a 
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monopoly commercial software provider seeks the optimal design and price to 
maximize its profit.  
From the first model, the analysis suggests that the profit of the commercial firm is 
dependent on the fit cost and the positioning of open source software. The profit of the 
commercial firm is maximized when the open source software targets more specialized 
users. Furthermore, the market share of the commercial firm is largest when the open 
source software caters to users with extreme requirements, and the commercial firm 
should set a low price to capture a proportion of the market. In addition, we find that the 
social welfare is maximized when open source software targets more specialized users. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that the commercial firm gains more profit when there’s 
positive network externalities.  
From the second model, we find that the optimal strategies are not unique for a 
commercial firm. Different characteristics of open source product will lead to different 
strategies. In some circumstance, if open source provides better user interface, 
commercial software firm needs to provide better usability and functionality with lower 
price to maintain the demand. As a result, the profit is cut down. If open source 
provides better functionality, the profit of commercial firm will be either higher or 
lower which is dependent on the current characteristics of open source software. 
Furthermore, consumers are always better off when the open source software provides 
better usability or functionality. It is a good situation for users that open source provides 
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better usability and functionality. In the other circumstance, when open source provides 
higher usability or functionality, commercial firm have to provide less usability (but 
still higher than open source usability) and functionality with higher price. Through 
giving up some consumers but increasing price, commercial firm still can make profit. 
When open source is more and more strong, commercial firm could not compete with it 
using this interior strategy, and should change to boundary strategy. At the end, when 
the open source has sufficient better advantage over functionality relative to its 
disadvantage in user interface, the commercial firm will be driven out of the market.  
Our research has limitations that can be extended in the following directions. For model 
1, first, we shall analyze whether the commercial firm should reach out to attract open 
source users to compete. That is, whether all customers located between open source 
and proprietary software should be served. Secondly, we shall explore the possibility of 
different network intensity for open source and proprietary software. Finally, we shall 
provide answers to optimal strategies for the more complicate situation when the fit 
cost is high ( t v> ). For model 2, we will investigate a two-period model with network 
externality. In considering network externality, we will study the impact of new release 
(upgrade) of open source software. Upgrading (or new release) is common in the 
software industry. In general, the upgrading of software involves adding more features, 
improving the user interface, and fixing bugs. Bug fixing is a necessary task for each 
upgrade to sustain customer satisfaction. Thus, it’s of no strategic interest to study 
whether and how firms should fix their product. On the other hand, the improvement of 
137 
 
usability and functionality might have a strategic impact on firm’s profitability in the 
presence of the competing open source software. Provided by a new release of the open 
source software (which has better user interface and/or functionality), the commercial 
software users may choose to continue using the commercial software or switch to the 
open source software if they get more utility from the open source software; new 
consumers may enter the market and select either the open source software or the 
commercial software. Therefore, the commercial firm has to optimally upgrade its 
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We analyze a sequential game in which commercial software firm first choose the 
product characteristics and then choose the price when given the characteristics of open 
source software. To find the sub-game perfect equilibrium, we use backwards induction 
method. The price equilibrium has been analyzed. Then, the task is to find optimal 
product design. We solve these constrained optimization problems by using 
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After simplifying,  
1 2 1 2 1 2(1 18 12 )[36 (2 3 ) 9 8 ]os os os osc x c y c c x y c cλ = − + + − −  
1 2 1 2 1 2(1 18 12 )[36 (2 3 ) 9 8 ]os os os osc x c y c c x y c cμ = − − + + − −  
* * * *0, 0, 0, 0ps os ps ps osy y y x x P> − > − > >  are assured by 1 21 18 12 0os osc x c y− + >  
To ensure * 0π > , 2 1 2
1 2




c x c yx y
c c
− + −+ <  
If 1 2 1 236 (2 3 ) 9 8 0os osc c x y c c+ − − > , then 0λ >  
If 1 2 1 236 (2 3 ) 9 8 0os osc c x y c c+ − − < , then 0μ >  
For Case 1, the boundary solution is invalid because of negative profit. For Case 2, the 
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We express the above conditions in the shaded area of Figure 3.7.  
Therefore, under the condition that 2 1 2
1 2
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* 2 1 2 2 2
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c c
π + − + + += +           (6) 
In the equilibrium, the consumer surplus can be solved as the following: 
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Thus,  
1 2 1 2
1 2
2 207 108 243 132
486 216
os os os osc x c x c y c yCS
c c
+ + + += +  
For both Case 1&2, there is an interior solution for each. Since they are too complex to 
express here, we just give some conditions to assure their ranges. Through 
maximization conditions:  
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 20, 0, 0, 0, ( )
ps ps ps ps ps ps ps psx y x y x y x y
π π π π π π π∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = < < >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂i  
and the conditions: 
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* * * *0, 0, 0, 0ps os ps ps osy y y x x P> − > − > > , 














+− >  is needed and the optimal 
location of proprietary software should be on the part of the curve (see Figure 3.9):  
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π −∂ = ⇒ =∂ −                         (9) 
Put Eq. (9) into Eq. (8), we find  
2
1 2 0ps ps os psc x x c yπ = − − <  
Thus, if the open source has sufficient better advantage over functionality relative to its 






− >− ,), the commercial firm will be driven out of 




Chapter 4.  Partially Opening Source Code: A 
New Competitive Tool For Software Firms 
4.1 Introduction 
Microsoft, the once strongest opponent to open source movement, has recently decided 
to include open source code in its shipping of Windows Server 2003 Cluster Edition 
(Galli 2005). Sun Microsystems is actively involved in the development of open source 
based Java projects in a hope to promote Java-related products. Without a doubt, the 
profitability of a commercial firm is affected (if not threatened) when the consumers are 
offered with an alternative free option other than its proprietary software. Commercial 
software firms are now confronted with the critical decision on how to optimally 
compete with open source software. Some previous works try to seek answers of how 
the commercial software firms compete with open source community. However, for the 
software firms, it is far not enough to only consider threatens from open source projects. 
The competitions among the software firms are still aggressive. Although competition 
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between commercial firms is the traditional topic, yet one phenomenon makes this 
traditional problem shedding a new light. 
Netscape opened source of their web browser to public for free, which was released as 
the Mozilla open source project. IBM offered the source code of Cloudscape, a 
Java-based relational database software, to the Apache Software Foundation. Zend 
Technologies Ltd., who offered proprietary Web applications and development tools, 
participated in the PHP open source community. Such actions were followed by a 
bunch of big firms like Sun who also opened part of their commercial code. More and 
more commercial firms come to realize that combining open source strategy can make 
more value for them in the aggressively competitive environment. 
The world was shocked again. People cannot understand why these firms would give 
up their profit to support the open source movement. Some industry practitioners come 
to realize that mixing open source with commercial software is the great prospect for 
success with open source (Taft 2005). Adam Fitzgerald, director for developer 
solutions at BEA Systems Inc., of San Jose, California, said at the panel at the 
BEAWorld conference: “You need to start thinking about what an open-source solution 
can do for you and identify best practices and best-of-breed open-source technology. 
This notion of blending open source solutions is what we see customers already using.” 
“Combining the best open source software and the best commercial software will give 
you the best solution,” said by Zhongyuan Zheng, vice president for R&D at 
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Beijing-based Red Flag Software Co. Ltd., China’s premier Linux vendor and maker of 
Red Flag Linux. In addition, among those papers discussing the competition between 
open source and proprietary software or competition among the for-profit software 
firms, few studies examined the open source as a software company’s competing 
for-profit strategy. It turns out that there are very few papers discussing the situation 
when some software firms open part of their code for profit reasons to actively compete 
with other software firms. 
Thus, in this study, instead of focusing on the competition between open source and 
proprietary software, we will study the competition between two profit-oriented firms, 
and analyze the model that when open source is as a software company’s competing 
for-profit strategy. We seek to find insights from answers of these questions: Why does 
a for-profit firm open up its commercial product? How much should the firm open to 
achieve most profit? What is the best competition structure of the market when both 
firms choose their best competitive strategies? In addition, we consider the situations 
whether there is a competing open source product available in the software market or 
not. We try to see how the presence of open source affects the strategies of commercial 
firms. 
4.2 Literature Review 
The open source phenomenon has captured attention by academic scholars in various 
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areas. As mentioned in the previous charpter (section 3.2), there are three streams of 
research in examining open source phenonmenon. One stream of literature deals with 
the motivation of participating in open source projects (Lerner and Tirole 2002, 
Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003, Schmidt and Schnitzer 2003, Lakhani and Wolf 2005, 
Roberts et al 2006, etc.). A second stream of research compares the quality of open 
source and proprietary software (Kuan 2001, Johnson 2004, Shell 2005, Massel 2005, 
Bessen 2005, Gaudeul 2004, etc.). A third stream of research focuses on the 
competition between open source and commercial software (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat 2006, Gaudeul 2004, etc.). 
Our research is related but different to the third stream of research. We study the 
competition between two commercial software firms, instead of competition between 
open source and commercial software product. Our model is different from other 
traditional competition model in that we investigate the hybrid business model of open 
source and proprietary software by using economic modeling approach. Based on 
survey of software firms, Bonaccorsi et al (2006) found that few firms choose a pure 
business model by offering open source solutions alone, and vast majority receive 
revenues from hybrid business model which attempts to combine the advantages of 
open source with proprietary software. We adopt vertical differentiation model to 
examine the competition between two profit-oriented firms, considering whether to 
adopt open source strategy. 
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4.3 The Model 
There are two competing systems in the software market provided by two software 
firms. In order to differentiate with each other, both of them will consider opening 
part of their source codes. There are two cases to be analyzed in this section. (1) There 
is no competing pure open source system available in the market. Two firms will 
compete with each other in duopoly market. (2) There is the competing pure open 
source system in the market. In this case, two software firms not only consider the 
competition between each other, but also consider the competition with the open 
source software.  
Consider two profit-seeking software firms A and B that provide competing systems. 
Firm A and B decide to compete with each other by opening the source codes of some 
parts of the systems. The proportion of open source is specified by αA and αB 
respectively, where αA or αB is between 0 and 1. They provide open source components 
(αA or αB) publicly available for free; and sell the proprietary portion (1- αA, or 1- αB) at 
price PA and PB respectively. The end users need both the proprietary portion and open 
source component to deploy the entire system.  
Let θ denote consumer’s naïveté, i.e., θ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, with 0 
referring to the most naïve consumer, and 1 referring to the most skillful consumer. 
Consumers choose one of the following options to maximize their own utility: (1) buy 
the partial product from firm A at price PA and integrate it with open source component 
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provided by firm A; (2) buy the partial product from firm B at price PB and integrate it 
with open source component provided by firm B; (3a) develop the part of the product 
by themselves and integrate it with open source component provided by the firm which 
opens more proportion, if there is no competing open source product available in the 
software market; or (3b) adopt the pure open source product if there is a competing 
open source product in the market.  
Before defining user’s utility function, we need to clarify the cost for users. In case 
when users choose to make use of open source component provided by the firms or the 
pure open source product, users incur the customization cost. The customization cost is 
determined by consumer’s skillfulness (θ) and the degree of openness of the system (α). 
Users with higher computer skills incur lower cost of customization. Furthermore, 
more proportion of the open source component requires more effort to customize, since 
users have to go through more (complex) source codes to carry out configuration and 
customization at various points. Thus, we define customization cost as: 
( , ) (1 )C cα θ α θ= ⋅ ⋅ −  
In case when the users choose to develop the rest of the software by themselves, they 
incur the development cost proportional to their skill and the amount of workload.  
Users with higher computer skills incur lower development cost. In addition, the more 
proportion of the open source component, the less development cost required, since the 
less proportions need to self-develop. Hence, we define development cost as:  
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( , ) (1 ) (1 )D dα θ α θ= ⋅ − ⋅ −  
Although users endure customization cost and development cost for adopting or 
developing open source system, they also obtain additional benefit from open source. 
For example, end users have more flexibility of software usage. They can customize the 
system, which would be more suitable for their own requirements. If the system is open 
source, the user can put it on the open source host such as SourceForge.net. Other open 
source users or developers, if interested in the program, will improve the performance 
of the system by modifying the functions, fixing bugs, or providing support and so on. 
Therefore, we assume there is the additional benefit for users who adopt open source. 
Users with higher computer skills obtain more benefit from open source. At meanwhile, 
more proportion of the open source component brings more flexibility to customize and 
thereafter brings more benefit for users. Thus, we define the benefit from adopting open 
source as:  
( , )S sα θ α θ= ⋅ ⋅  
4.3.1 Case 1: Duopoly Market Dominated by Firm A and Firm B. 
Let’s first discuss the case when there is no competing open source product available in 
the software market. Firm A and B dominate the market, but they need to consider there 
are some highly skillful users who prefer to open source products, and may 
self-develop the systems. According to the options for customers: (1) buy the partial 
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product from firm A at price PA and integrate it with open source component provided 
by firm A; (2) buy the partial product from firm B at price PB and integrate it with open 
source component provided by firm B; (3a) develop the part of the product by 
themselves and integrate it with open source component provided by the firm which 
opens more proportion, we define utility functions when customers choose different 
options as:  
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
(max[ , ], ) (max[ , ], ) (1, )
A A A A
B B B B
F A B A B
U v P C S
U v P C S
U v C D S
α θ α θ
α θ α θ
α α θ α α θ θ
= − − +
= − − +
= − − +
 
where ν is consumer’s valuation; UA is the consumer’s utility function by adopting 
option (1); UB is the utility function by adopting option (2); UF is the utility function by 
adopting option (3a). We assume the customization cost (c) is less than the development 
cost (d), so that when there is open source code available, the users will not develop the 
same codes by themselves. The basic requirements for c, d, and s are 0<c<d and s>0. In 
the following discussions, in order to simplify the computation, we assume αA>αB, 
which is symmetric with the opposite side that αA<αB. In this chapter, we will not 
discuss the case αA=αB. When αA=αB, the research objective comes to the competition 
between open source and proprietary software, instead of competition between two 
for-profit software firms, which is the focus of this chapter. (We will investigate 
competition between open source and proprietary software in Chapter 3.)  
According to the level of expertise θ (0≤θ≤1, small θ for basic users) in using the open 
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source software, the consumers consist of three groups of persons: basic users, 
advanced users and expert users. The distribution of the users is shown in Figure 4.1. 
By letting UA=UB, we get the marginal user (θ1) who is indifferent with option (1) and 
option (2). Similarly, by letting UA=UF, we get the marginal user (θ2) who is indifferent 
with option (2) and option (3a). Users located at (0, θ1) are basic users who will choose 
option (2), since they have much higher cost but less benefit for using open source 
software. These basic users tend to use the software system with less open source part 
(firm B’s product). Users located at (θ1, θ2) are advanced users who will choose option 
(1). Users located at (θ2, 1) are expert users who will choose option (3a), since they can 
obtain more benefit from adopting open source but less cost for customization and 















α αθ α α
αθ α
− + −= − +
− −= − +
 
Firm A and B should optimally set the software price and degree of openness to 
maximize their profits. In order to focus on the competition between firm A and B, we 
 




assume that no consumer between 0 and 1 is “stranded” by three options discussed 
above. In the following part we will analyze firm A and B’s optimal strategies to 
maximize their profits. The market size is normalized to 1, and thereby the market 
share of firm A and B are θ2-θ1 and θ1, respectively, which are shown in Figure 4.2. The 
expert users who lie in (θ2, 1) will choose to self-develop part of the software and 
integrate it with open source component provided by firm A. 










= ⋅  
In order to solve the profit maximization problem for firm A and B, we use the 
method of backward induction (Schotter 2001). As defined by Schotter (2001), 
backward induction is “the process of solving a game by going to its end and working 
backward, to figure out what each player will do along the way”. The firms first 
decide how much to open the source code, and then set the price of the produce. Thus, 
first, we solve maximization functions under the known degree of openness ( Aα , Bα ), 
 




and get the pre-optimal price ( 'AP ,
'
BP ) of each firm; second, we substitute price ( AP ,




BP ), and solve optimal the 
degree of openness ( *Aα , *Bα ) and then get ( *AP , *BP ). The detailed procedures are 
shown in Appendix.  
Lemma 1. In the duopoly market, which is dominated by firm A and B, given the 




AD  , and 
'
Aπ , respectively; the pre-optimal price, demand and profit for firm B 
is 'BP , 
'
BD , and 
'
Bπ , respectively. All these pre-optimal solutions are shown in Table 
4.1. 
Firm A and B needs to optimally design the degree of openness (αA, αB) to maximize 
their profits. Since the derivations are very laborious, the details are shown in 
Appendix. Through careful analysis and derivation, we find that the best strategy for 
Table 4.1 Pre-optimal Strategy in Duopoly Market 




(1 )( )( ( ) 2 ) [ ( ) ( )]
( )( )[ 4 ( ) (4 3 ) 3( )]
A A B A B
A
B A
c d s ds c d d s c s
s c s d c s c d s s d
α α α α απ α α
− − − + − + + − += + + − + + − + + +  
Price '
(1 )( )[ ( ) 2 ]




c d s dsP
c s c d s d s
α α α
α α
− − − += − + + − + + +  
Demand '
[ ( ) 2 ][ ( ) ( )]




c d s ds c d d s c sD
c s c s c d s d s
α α
α α
− + − + + − += + − + + − + + +  




( )[2 2 ( ) ( )(2 )]
( )[ 4 ( ) (4 3 ) 3( )]
A B B A
B
B A
cd cs ds c c s c d c s
s c c s c d s s d
α α α απ α α
− + + − + + − += + − + + − + + +  
Price '
( )[2 2 ( ) ( )(2 )]
4 ( ) (4 3 ) 3( )
A B B A
B
B A
cd cs ds c c s c d c sP
c s c d s d s
α α α α
α α
− + + − + + − += − + + − + + +  
Demand '
2 2 ( ) ( )(2 )




cd cs ds c c s c d c sD
c s c s c d s d s
α α
α α
+ + − + + − += + − + + − + + +  
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firm B is not to open any part of the source code ( * 0Bα = ).  
Proposition 1. In the duopoly market, one of the firms will choose not to open any part 
of the source code.  
The firm, which chooses not to open any part of the source code, targets at the most 
basic users in the software market. This kind of users does not have any advanced 
computer skills, so that they do not have enough ability to customize the systems 
according to their own needs by themselves. Therefore, they do not have intention to 
use the products with the open source part. The firm knows this point! The firm will 
set a “good” price to get most profit and at the same time ensure these users to accept 
this price to buy its product. However, there are many advanced users, who care much 
more about flexibility. The other firm in the duopoly market will decide how much it 
will open the source code to attract more advanced users, and at the same time, 
consider the price of the product to ensure its own profit. 
Lemma 2. In the duopoly market, which is dominated by firm A and B, under firm B’s 
best choice: * 0Bα = , the pre-optimal price, demand and profit for firm A is ''AP , ''AD  , 
and ''Aπ , respectively; the pre-optimal price, demand and profit for firm B is ''BP , ''BD , 
and ''Bπ , respectively. All the pre-optimal solutions are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Although we have mathematically solved the closed forms of optimal degree of 
openness ( *Aα ), which are shown in Appendix, yet it is a too complex formula 
expressed by s, c, and d. Fortunately, we can clearly show the relationships of *Aα  with 
s, c and d (in Figure 4.3): (1) The more the additional benefit users can obtain, the fewer 
proportions firm A will open; (2) The more the customization cost, the fewer 
proportions firm A will open; (3) The more the development cost, the more proportions 
firm A will open. 
  
Figure 4.3 Relationships of Firm A’s Optimal Degree of Openness ( *Aα ) With Benefit 




















Table 4.2 Pre-optimal Strategy in Duopoly Market 
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Corollary 1. The optimal degree of openness of firm A is positively affected by 
development cost, but negatively affected by additional benefit or customization cost.  
In order to attract more advanced users, firm A provides a hybrid product of 
proprietary software product and open source product. Those advanced users do not 
have ability to develop the software system by themselves, but have strong 
requirements for flexibility. Thus, they choose the hybrid product provided by firm A. 
The optimal degree of openness of firm A is impacted by customization cost, 
development cost and additional benefit. First, the higher the development cost, the 
more difficulties the users meet in developing software by themselves. Hence, some 
of the advanced users will not develop the software by themselves. Thus, firm A 
would open more part of source code to attract more advanced users to let them give 
up self-developing the software. Second, the higher the customization cost, the more 
users would have more difficulties to customize the product. Although some of the 
users like flexibility, yet higher customization cost keep them away from the product 
with more open source part. Thus, firm A would open less part of source code to bring 
less trouble to customize product and at the same time to give the users some 
flexibility. Third, the higher the additional benefit from using open source, the more 
advanced users would like to develop part of the product by themselves. But for some 
basic users, this benefit would not affect them too much. Firm A would open less part 
of source code to attract more basic users but give up some advanced users.  
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Same as the optimal degree of openness of firm A, the optimal results including profit, 
price and demand for both firms are too complex formulas expressed by s, c, and d. It 
shows that the nature or characteristics of product would affect the firms’ decision 
making. For example, for a complex software system, if users want to customize it, 
they will incur high customization cost; obviously, if users want to develop a complex 
system, they must bear the high development cost. From graphic analysis, we find how 
these cost and benefit affect the optimal strategies of software firms. Corollary 2(a, b, 
c) present the relationships of firms’ optimal profits with additional benefit and costs, 
which are graphically shown in Table 4.3. Corollary 3(a, b, c) present the relationships 
of firms’ optimal price with additional benefit and costs, which are graphically shown 
in Table 4.4. Corollary 4(a, b, c) present the relationships of firms’ optimal demand 
with additional benefit and costs, which are graphically shown in Table 4.5. 
Corollary 2a. (Profit and s) When 30
4
c d< < , firm A’s profit is increasing first and 
decreasing later, with the increase of s; when 3
4
d c d≤ < , firm A’s profit is 
monotonically deceasing with the increase of s. Firm B’s profit is monotonically 
deceasing with the increase of s. 
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Corollary 2b. (Profit and d) Firm A’s profit is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of d. Firm B’s profit is monotonically increasing with the increase of d. 
Corollary 2c. (Profit and c) When 0
5
ds< < , firm A’s profit is decreasing first and 
increasing later, with the increase of c; when 
5
ds ≥ , firm A’s profit is monotonically 
deceasing with the increase of c. Firm B’s profit is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of c. 
Table 4.3 Relationships of Optimal Profit With Benefit (s) And Cost (c, d) 































































Corollary 3a. (Price and s) Firm A’s price is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of s. When 30
4
c d< ≤ , firm B’s price is monotonically increasing with the 
Table 4.4 Relationships of Optimal Price With Benefit (s) And Cost (c, d) 









































































increase of s; when 3
4
c d> , firm B’s price is monotonically deceasing with the 
increase of s. 
Corollary 3b. (Price and d) Firm A’s price is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of d. Firm B’s price is monotonically increasing with the increase of d. 
Corollary 3c. (Price and c) When 0
3
ds< < , firm A’s price is monotonically 
increasing with the increase of c; when 4
3 9
d s d≤ ≤ , firm A’s price is decreasing first 
and increasing later, with the increase of c; When 4
9
s d> , firm A’s price is 
monotonically decreasing with the increase of c. Firm B’s price is monotone, and 
increasing with the increase of c.  
Corollary 4a. (Demand and s) When 10
2
c d< ≤ , firm A’s demand is increasing first 
and decreasing later, with the increase of s; when 1
2
d c d< < , firm A’s demand is 
monotonically deceasing with the increase of s. Firm B’s demand is monotonically 
deceasing with the increase of s. 
Corollary 4b. (Demand and d) Firm A’s demand is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of d. Firm B’s demand is monotonically increasing with the increase of d.  
Corollary 4c. (Demand and c) Firm A’s demand is monotonically decreasing with the 
increase of c. When 0
25
ds< ≤ , firm B’s demand is increasing first and decreasing 
later, with the increase of c; when 
25
ds > , firm B’s demand is monotonically 
increasing with the increase of c. 
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From corollary 2, 3, 4, we get the following insights:  
First, we find that when the development cost is higher, both firm A and B will obtain 
more profits and higher demands and set higher prices. It is because high development 
cost makes few users choose to self-develop part of the product. Firm A would open 
more part to attract more advanced users, although it would lose some basic users 
because of opening more part. Thus, both firms may have high market share when 
Table 4.5 Relationships of Optimal Demand With Benefit (s) And Cost (c, d) 






































































development cost is high.  
Second, for firm B, the increase of additional benefit makes its profit decrease; the 
increase of customization cost makes its profit increase. It is good for users who 
would like to use product with open source part when the additional benefit is high. 
Some basic users, who decide to choose firm B’s pure proprietary product initially, 
may use firm A’s hybrid product because of high additional benefit. However, if 
customization cost is high, there would be many users who want to use pure 
proprietary product because they do not have enough computer skills to customize 
open source product.  
Third, we find that the impact of additional benefit (s) or customization cost (c) on 
firms’ profit, price and demand are different according to different relationships 
between s or c and development cost (d). For example, with the increase of s, when 
customization cost is relatively small ( 30
4
c d< ≤ ), firm A’s profit is increasing first 
and decreasing later; when customization cost is relatively large ( 3
4
d c d< < ), firm 
A’s profit is monotonically decreasing. For another example, with the increase of c, 
when additional benefit is relatively small ( 0
5
ds< < ), firm A’s profit is decreasing 
first and increasing later; when additional benefit is relatively large (
5
ds ≥ ), firm A’s 
profit is monotonically decreasing. 
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4.3.2 Case 2: There is a Competing Pure Open Source Product 
In the duopoly market, which is dominated by firm A and B, some users may choose to 
self-develop the software in order to achieve more flexibility. However, if there is a 
pure open source product available, they do not need to self-develop the software. 
What strategies will the firms adopt, open or not open?  
There are three options for customers: (1) buy the partial product from firm A at price 
PA and integrate it with open source component provided by firm A; (2) buy the partial 
product from firm B at price PB and integrate it with open source component provided 
by firm B; (3b) adopt the pure open source product. Same as previous case, we define 
utility functions when customers choose different options as:  
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
(1, ) (1, )
A A A A
B B B B
F
U v P C S
U v P C S
U v C S
α θ α θ
α θ α θ
θ θ
= − − +
= − − +
= − +
 
where ν is consumer’s valuation; UA is the consumer’s utility function by adopting 
option (1); UB is the utility function by adopting option (2); UF is the utility function by 
adopting option (3b). The first two utility functions are the same as those in Case 1. The 
only difference is that customers, who are going to use pure open source product, will 
not incur development cost any more. Therefore, the utility function for the third option 
is not related to development cost. We still assume the customization cost (c) is less 
than the development cost (d), so that when there is open source code available, the 
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users will not develop the same code by themselves. Same as the above case, we 
assume αA>αB to simplify the computation.  
By letting UA=UB, we get the marginal user (θ1) who is indifferent with option (1) and 
option (2). Similarly, by letting UA=UF, we get the marginal user (θ2) who is indifferent 
with option (2) and option (3b). Users located at (0, θ1) are basic users who will choose 
option (2), since they have much higher cost but less benefit for using open source 
software. These basic users tend to use the software system with less open source part 
(firm B’s product). Users located at (θ1, θ2) are advanced users who will choose option 
(1). Users located at (θ2, 1) are expert users who will choose pure open source product, 
since they can obtain more benefit from adopting open source but less cost for 















α αθ α α
αθ α
− + −= − +
− −= − +
 
Firm A and B should optimally set the software price and degree of openness to 
maximize their profits. In order to focus on the competition between firm A and B and 
open source product, we assume that no consumer between 0 and 1 is “stranded” by 
three options discussed above. In the following part we will analyze firm A and B’s 
optimal strategies to maximize their profits. The market size is normalized to 1, and 
thereby the market share of firm A and B and open source are θ2-θ1, θ1 and 1-θ2 
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respectively, which are shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
We follow the same procedure as in Case 1 and solve the optimal strategies for both 
firms.  
Proposition 2. When there are three competing systems in the software market: two of 
them are provided by two for-profit software firms, and one of them is a pure open 
source system, one of the software firms will not choose to open any part of the 
source codes; one of the firms will choose to open 43% of the source codes. ( * 0Bα = ,
* 3
7A
α = ) 
It is interesting to find that when there is a competing pure open source system in the 
software market, the optimal degree of openness of firm A is not related to 
customization cost or additional benefit, i.e., it is constant. Since there are a pure open 
source and a pure proprietary product (provided by firm B) available in the market, firm 
A’s product is in the middle of them. It gives users some flexibility benefit, but at the 
same time, users need to incur customization cost and pay for it. The degree of 
openness differentiates firm A’s product from the pure open source and pure proprietary 
 
Figure 4.4 Market Share of Firm A, B and OSS 
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product. If firm A opens more proportion, it will be more close to pure open source 
product, but more differentiated from firm B; if firm A opens less, it will be more close 
to firm B’s product, but more differentiated from the open source product. Therefore, 
the optimal degree of openness is the key factor that best differentiates firm A’s product 
from others. It is not surprised that the optimal degree of openness is constant in that the 
changes of c or s could not affect the differentiation between firm A and open source 
and firm B’s product. 
Proposition 3. When there are three competing systems in the software market: two of 
them are provided by two for-profit software firms: A and B, and one of them is a 
pure open source system, the optimal price, demand and profit for firm A is *AP , 
*
AD  , 
and *Aπ , respectively; the optimal price, demand and profit for firm B is *BP , *BD , 
and *Bπ , respectively. All the optimal solutions are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Shown in proposition 3, the optimal strategies are determined by customization cost (c) 
and additional benefit from adopting open source (s). Through comparative static 
Table 4.6 Optimal Strategy When There is a Competing Pure Open Source Product
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analysis (shown in Table 4.7), we can find how these cost and benefit affect the 
optimal strategies of software firms, which are presented in Corollary 5, 6, 7. 
When there are three competing systems in the software market: two of them are 
provided by two for-profit software firms: A and B, and one of them is a pure open 
source system,  
Corollary 5a. (Profit and c) firm A’s optimal profit is monotonically increasing with 
the increase of c; firm B’s optimal profit is monotonically increasing with the increase 
of c. 
Corollary 5b. (Profit and s) firm A’s optimal profit is monotonically decreasing with 
the increase of s; firm B’s optimal profit is monotonically decreasing with the increase 
of s. 
Corollary 6a. (Price and c) firm A’s optimal price is monotonically increasing with 
the increase of c; firm B’s optimal price is monotonically increasing with the increase 
Table 4.7 Comparative Static Analysis 
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Corollary 6b. (Price and s) firm A’s optimal price is constant with the increase of s; 
firm B’s optimal price is constant with the increase of s. 
Corollary 7a. (Demand and c) firm A’s optimal demand is monotonically increasing 
with the increase of c; firm B’s optimal demand is monotonically increasing with the 
increase of c. 
Corollary 7b. (Demand and s) firm A’s optimal demand is monotonically decreasing 
with the increase of s; firm B’s optimal demand is monotonically decreasing with the 
increase of s. 
Proposition 4. When there are three competing systems in the software market: two of 
them are provided by two for-profit software firms: A and B, and one of them is a 
pure open source system, both firms are profitable, but the optimal profit, price and 
demand of firm A are always lower than those of firm B: firm B’s optimal profit is 7 
times larger than firm A’s; B’s market share is twice of A’s; B’s price is 3.5 times higher 
than A’s. 
These results are reasonable and coincide with the reality. There are three competing 
software products in the market: one is a pure proprietary software product (provided 
by firm B), one is a pure open source software product, and one is between them -- a 
hybrid product of proprietary and open source software product (provided by firm A). 
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The designers of firm A need to consider both firm B and open source product when 
they design the product and sets price. In order to make sure that fewer users will 
choose open source system, they need to open more part and set lower price; at 
meanwhile, in order to capture more users from firm B, they need to open less part and 
set lower price. Firm A wants to squeeze both the demand for firm B and open source. 
Therefore, firm A faces more severe competitions from both firm B and open source.  
Social welfare includes the total utilities of users, and the profits of firm A and firm B. 





B A F A BW U d U d U d
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ π π= + + + +∫ ∫ ∫  
Proposition 5. If there is a competing pure open source product in the market, the social 
welfare when commercial firms adopt optimal strategies goes to: 
2
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Figure 4.5). 





≤ ), the consumer surplus would be larger than firms’ profits; when 




> ), customers’ 
valuation to the product determines whether the consumer surplus is larger than firms’ 





−> + ), consumer surplus is larger than 
profits; otherwise, consumer surplus is less than profits.    
In summary, the model examines the optimal strategies of two commercial firms 
competing with each other. Their strategies are determined by the customization cost, 
development cost and additional benefit defined previously. It implies that the nature of 
 




the product is important for commercial firms in product design and setting price. In the 
other words, the commercial firms’ decision making on product design and price setting 
depends on the heterogeneity of the product. For example, for the complex software 
product, the customization cost will be high. If someone wants to self-develop it, the 
development cost will also be high. For the simple software product, the customization 
cost will be low, and if someone wants to self-develop it, the development cost will be 
low too. The strategies of commercial firms responding to complex software or simple 
software must be different. These differences have been clearly specified in the model. 
Furthermore, we compare the firms’ optimal strategies under different situations: there 
is or is not a competing open source product available in the software market. The 
results suggest that when there is a competing pure open source product, one of the 
firms would not open any source code and provide a pure proprietary software system; 
the other firm would open the fixed source code, which is not related to the nature of the 
product. When there is no competing pure open source product in the market, one of the 
firm would also provide a pure proprietary software system, and the other firm would 
provide a hybrid product, of which how much of open would determined by the nature 
of the product.  
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
Open source software has been gaining popularity among individuals and organizations 
as a “free” alternative to traditional proprietary software. The popularity of open source 
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not only brings competition to proprietary software, but also awakes the software firms 
to adopt open source strategy to enhance their competitive advantage. Many industry 
practices suggest that participating open source may bring software firms profitability. 
How much does the firm earn from participating open source? To what extend the 
firm should participate open source? This research seeks to answer these questions by 
an economic modeling approach.  
Our model examines the optimal strategies of two profit-oriented firms’ competition. In 
order to have more competing advantages, they consider whether to adopt the open 
source strategy or not. In the other words, they need to find whether they should open 
part of the source code and how much they need to open. We find that the software 
firms’ decision making on product design and price setting depends on the 
heterogeneity of the product. The characteristics of the product determine the strategies 
of software firms because these characteristics directly influence the customization cost, 
development cost and addition benefit, which are the key determinants of firms’ 
strategies. The impact of these cost and benefit on the firms’ strategies has been 
analyzed in the above corollaries. Some interesting results may shed light on pricing 
and product design of software firms when facing competitions from colleagues.  
First, whatever there is a competing pure open source product or not, one of the firms 
would choose to provide pure proprietary software. The firm, which chooses not to 
open any part of the source code, targets at the most basic users in the software 
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market. This kind of users does not have any advanced computer skills, so that they 
do not have enough ability to customize the systems according to their own needs by 
themselves. Therefore, they do not have intention to use the products with the open 
source part. The firm knows this point! The firm will set a “good” price to let it get 
most profit and at the same time ensure these users to accept this price to buy its 
product.  
Second, we find that when there are three competing systems in the software market: 
two of them are provided by two for-profit software firms: A and B, and one of them 
is a pure open source system, the optimal degree of openness of firm A is not related to 
customization cost or additional benefit, i.e., it is constant. Since there are a pure open 
source and a pure proprietary product (provided by firm B) available in the market, firm 
A’s product is in the middle of them. It gives users some flexibility benefit, but at the 
same time, users need to incur customization cost and pay for it. The degree of 
openness differentiates firm A’s product from the pure open source and pure proprietary 
product. If firm A opens more proportion, it will be more close to pure open source 
product, but more differentiated from firm B; if firm A opens less, it will be more close 
to firm B’s product, but more differentiated from the open source product. Therefore, 
the optimal degree of openness is the key factor that best differentiates firm A’s product 
from others. It is not surprised that the optimal degree of openness is constant in that the 
changes of c or s could not affect the differentiation between firm A and open source 
and firm B’s product. 
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Third, when there are three competing systems in the software market: two of them 
are provided by two for-profit software firms: A and B, and one of them is a pure open 
source system, both firms are profitable, but the optimal profit, price and demand of 
firm A are always lower than those of firm B. The designers of firm A need to consider 
both firm B and open source product when they design the product and sets price. In 
order to make sure that fewer users will choose open source system, they need to open 
more part and set lower price; at meanwhile, in order to capture more users from firm B, 
they need to open less part and set lower price. Firm A wants to squeeze both the 
demand for firm B and open source. Therefore, firm A faces more severe competitions 
from both firm B and open source. 
Our study has limitations that provide avenues for future research. We assume 
customers are uniformly located between 0 and 1 in the current study. We will use 
general form to analyze the characteristic of the firms’ strategies in the future research.  
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When there is no competing open source software available in the software market: 
first we solve maximization profit functions under the known degree of openness ( Aα ,
Bα ), and get the pre-optimal price ( 'AP , 'BP ) of each firm; second, we substitute price 
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We find that (1) * *1A Bα α= or (2) * * 2A Bα α=  or (3) * 0Bα = . The first two solutions are 
not satisfied with our requirements, because the special case that A Bα α= have been 
discussed in Chapter 3. Here, we only examine the third solution. When * 0Bα = , *Aα  
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When c, s, d has different combinations, the optimal degree of openness of firm A is one 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work 
This thesis applies social network analysis and economic theory and methodology in 
Information Systems research to study issues associated with open source software 
projects and their applications in the software industry. Three essays examine three 
issues: survival of OSS, competition between OSS and proprietary software, and 
competition between two software firms. A few implications from these studies are 
summarized in the following sections.  
5.1 Evaluating Longitudinal Success of Open Source 
Software Projects 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the long term effects of communication 
pattern on the success of open source projects. We base our research on the theoretical 
study of social network theory. Generally speaking, by observing changes in 
communication patterns for an extended period, we find significant impacts of 
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communication patterns on the outcome of the project.  
The findings of our research has implications for project managers and developers in 
open source environments, as well as for managers of commercial software firms, 
which are actively participating in open source projects. The project managers need to 
realize the importance of the communication pattern of project team. According to the 
objectives of projects, a proper and planned control for the communication among 
team members is crucial for the survivability of the open source projects. Since the 
view of project success from developers and general users are different, the project 
managers can reap the benefits if they structure their project teams with care. 
From a theoretical standpoint, we apply social network theory into the information 
systems domain, in particular, into the study of success of OSS projects. Our results 
suggest several directions for theory development on the effect of communication 
pattern of the project team on project success. First, it is important to recognize that 
the effect of communication pattern varies with the indicators of project success. OSS 
success has different dimensions. A single measurement or operationalization will not 
be sufficient to completely represent success. Second, it is important to recognize that 
success is transient. The changes of project status are caused by the dynamic 
communication pattern. Examining the status of projects over an extended period is a 
more rigorous method to assess the long term evolving success of OSS projects. Our 
research takes some important steps in this direction and we hope that further 
investigations of long term success from social network perspective are explored in 
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the future research.  
5.2 Optimal Software Design and Pricing 
In this study, we employ two models: a one-dimentional Hotelling model and a 
two-dimentional vertical differentiation model, to study the optimal strategies of 
commercial firms when consumers have different tastes. In particular, we seek to solve 
for the optimal design and pricing of proprietary software. Further, we analyze the 
impact of network externaltiy on the optimal strategy and profit of the commercial firm 
in the Hotelling model. The analysis in the Hotelling model suggests that the profit of 
the commercial firm is dependent on the fit cost and the positioning of open source 
software. Both the profit of the commercial firm and social welfare are maximized 
when the open source software targets more specialized users. From the second model, 
we find that the optimal strategies are not unique for a commercial firm. Different 
characteristics of open source product will lead to different strategies. Furthermore, 
consumers are always better off when the open source software provides better 
usability or functionality. It is a good situation for users that open source provides better 
usability and functionality. At the end, when the open source has sufficient better 
advantage over functionality relative to its disadvantage in user interface, the 
commercial firm will be driven out of the market.  
Our research can be extended in the following directions. For model 1, first, we shall 
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analyze whether the commercial firm should reach out to attract open source users to 
compete. That is, whether all customers located between open source and proprietary 
software should be served. Secondly, we shall explore the possibility of different 
network intensity for open source and proprietary software. Finally, we shall provide 
answers to optimal strategies for the more complicate situation when the fit cost is high. 
For model 2, we will investigate a two-period model with network externality. In 
considering network externality, we will study the impact of new release (upgrade) of 
open source software. The commercial firm needs to optimally upgrade its software and 
set up a new price in order to maximize profit. 
5.3 Partially Opening Source Code 
The popularity of open source not only brings competition to proprietary software, but 
also awakes the software firms to adopt open source strategy to enhance their 
competitive advantage. This model examines the optimal strategies of two 
profit-oriented firms’ competition. In order to have more competing advantages, they 
consider whether to adopt the open source strategy or not. We find that the software 
firms’ decision making on product design and price setting depends on the 
heterogeneity of the product. The characteristics of the product determine the strategies 
of software firms because these characteristics directly influence the customization cost, 
development cost and addition benefit, which are the key determinants of firms’ 
strategies. We find that whatever there is a competing pure open source product or not, 
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one of the firms would choose to provide pure proprietary software. Furthermore, when 
there are three competing systems in the software market: two of them are provided 
by two for-profit software firms and one of them is a pure open source system, the 
optimal degree of openness of both firms are not related to customization cost or 
additional benefit, i.e., they are constant. In this situation, there are a pure open source, 
a pure proprietary product, and a hybrid product of open source and proprietary 
software.   
This study has limitations that provide avenues for future research. We assume 
customers are uniformly located between 0 and 1 in the current study. We will use 
general form to analyze the characteristic of the firms’ strategies in the future research.  
To extend this study, we will consider the network effects to see the impact of the 
results.  
 
 
